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ABSTRACT 
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) can deliver large quantities of medications and 
medical supplies to anywhere in the United States and its territories within 12 hours of 
the federal decision to deploy. As an additional preparedness measure, many states and 
regions have elected to purchase and maintain similar medical countermeasure 
stockpiles locally. Theses stockpiles are a means of rapid access to critical medications 
necessary for use as post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) before the arrival of SNS assets. 
To assist state and local communities in determining the most efficient and cost-
effective PEP model for use in the event of an anthrax attack, this thesis analyzes four 
potential models. This analysis provides a framework by which state and local 
jurisdictions can evaluate the suitability of models for the provision of PEP in the event 
of a large-scale anthrax attack. Readers may employ these findings in evaluating the 
efficacy of their own local programs, and in determining the most appropriate PEP model 
based upon local priorities given variations in perceived needs and resource availability 
among communities. 
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This thesis explores four models that are currently available for the provision of 
post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) at the state or local level, in an effort to address the 
primary research questions:  
• What model is best suited to provide the most efficient and cost effective 
PEP in the event of an anthrax attack? 
• How can decision makers evaluate competing models given variation in 
perceived needs and resources available to meet those needs? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a policy options analysis that evaluates four potential policy 
options for use in the management of PEP in the event of an anthrax attack. The final 
result of the analysis is intended to provide the reader with a framework by which state or 
local planners can evaluate the appropriateness of a policy option relevant to their own 
jurisdiction-specific priorities. 
1. Policy Options 
The four policy options selected for analysis were the following. 
• Policy Option 1—a locally managed antibiotic medication stockpile, 
purchased, stored, sustained and deployed at the state, regional or local 
level. 
• Policy Option 2—a locally managed antibiotic medication stockpile, 
purchased and stored at the state, regional or local level, with its inventory 
sustained using a managed supply rotation model, through partnerships 
with public and/or private entities. 
• Policy Option 3—the provision of PEP to first responders/first receivers 
via medications prescribed and pre-dispensed to individual responders and 
stored in their homes. 
• Policy Option 4—reliance on the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) as a 
sole source of PEP, beyond medications currently on hand in local 
commercial and hospital pharmacy inventories.  
 xvii 
2. Evaluation Criteria and Outcome Values 
Each of above-mentioned policy options were individually assessed using the 
following five criteria. 
• Timeliness  
A =  PEP is immediately available for dispensing. 
B =  The availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to be <12 hours but 
not likely to be immediately accessible 
C =  The availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to be ≥12 hours 
• Cost 
A =  It is likely that full funding for a model can be absorbed in the 
typical operating budget. 
B =  The model requires some supplementation from outside funding 
source(s). 
C =  The model is likely to require majority or full funding from outside 
sources. 
• Logistics 
A =  It is likely that all logistical resources required for a model are 
readily available in most metropolitan areas. 
B =  Some outside or mutual aide assistance is likely to be required to 
meet the logistical demands of a model. 
C =  The model is likely to exceed the logistical capabilities of most 
metropolitan areas, thus requiring significant logistical support 
from outside resources. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance 
A =  The model is likely to be viewed as favorable by the majority of 
relevant stakeholder groups. 
B =  It is likely that there will be divided support among relevant 
stakeholder groups.  
C =  It is likely that fewer than half of the relevant stakeholder groups 
are likely to consider the model as favorable. 
• Comprehensiveness 
A =  The model is likely to provide sufficient quantities of PEP 
medications that are equally accessible to all population sectors. 
B =  The quantity of PEP medication available for dispensing is likely 
to be sufficient for only select portions of a population. 
 xviii 
C =  The model provides little or no availability to PEP medications. 
C. FINDINGS 
The following matrix provides a summary of the outcome values assigned to each 
of the evaluative criteria, specific to the four PEP models reviewed in this research. The 
results of this analysis are based on the general characteristics of each model as discussed 
throughout this research.  
 
Policy Option Timeliness Cost Logistics Stakeholder Acceptance Comprehensiveness 
Local Stockpiles B B A A B 
Third Party Inventory Mgmt B B C B B 
Pre-Dispensed to Homes  A C A B B 
SNS Only C A A A A 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
During the development of biological incident preparedness and response plans, 
the above matrix analysis will provide state and local planners with the framework to 
evaluate a PEP model based on the priorities of an individual jurisdiction. Some 
jurisdictions, especially those that are more rural, may find that limited financial and 
logistical resources might suggest that reliance on the SNS may be the most suitable 
model. In contrast, regions with less limited financial resources and sufficient 
administrative (logistical) capabilities may choose an alternative option, such as pre-
dispensing antibiotics to first responders for storage in their homes. Policy options should 
be carefully considered using criteria that are likely to have the most significant impact 
on the suitability of a given policy option. 
Consideration of factors beyond the scope of this thesis is crucial in determining 
the suitability of a PEP provision model. As an example, all PEP provision models that 
use points of dispensing (POD) as a means of distributing medications are heavily reliant 
upon the efficiency of POD activation and throughput processes for effective PEP 
distribution. The rapid availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to benefit only those 
jurisdictions with a demonstrated proficiency in POD activation and throughput 
procedures. Therefore, even an unlimited supply of PEP is likely to be of benefit to a 
jurisdiction with little or no POD throughput capability.  
 xix 
Despite the low probability, the catastrophic consequences of a bioterrorist attack 
are sufficient cause for concern. The size of an attack required to overwhelm the response 
system, and instill widespread fear remains unclear. Since financial resources are finite, 
policy makers at the federal, state and local levels must make difficult choices that 
require investments in people, technology, and materials, as well as strong partnerships 
between federal, state, and local governments. Strong partnerships between the public 
and private sectors are also paramount. Although terrorists have yet to carry out large-
scale attacks with biological weapons, the events of September 11 have clearly 
demonstrated a willingness to inflict mass casualties. This thesis serves as a vital resource 
for decision makers tasked with balancing the needs of stakeholders and the resources 
available to meet those needs. 
 xx 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis co-advisors Dr. Robert 
Josefek and Lynda Peters; your patience and experienced guidance throughout this 
journey has been invaluable. To all Center of Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) 
faculty and staff, your dedication to safeguarding the extraordinary quality of this 
exceptional program is commendable beyond words. Thank you for all that you do to 
support and guide our nation’s leaders in Homeland Security. 
I would also like to extend my appreciation to the Maryland Institute for 
Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) leadership, as well as to my 
professional colleagues and co-workers. Your enduring support has allowed me to take 
advantage of this amazing opportunity. Thank you for bearing the weight in my absence. 
To my companions in Cohorts 1301 and 1302, you are the greatest gifts of all. 
The value of a master’s degree pales in comparison to the value of the relationships we 
have fostered throughout the past 18 months. I have learned from each and every one of 
you during this excursion, both professionally and personally. I am a better person for 
having known you, and honored to have been in your company.  
Lastly, to my family and friends, your patience, encouragement, and 
understanding during the past 18 months have afforded me the ability to take advantage 
of this amazing opportunity. With your support, I have acquired irreplaceable experience, 
knowledge, and lifelong relationships throughout this journey. For that, I will be forever 
grateful. Addison and Alexander, your relentless thirst for knowledge and lust for life is 
my greatest inspiration. May you always keep those beautiful minds open to all that this 
world has to offer. 
 xxi 





Since the dawn of civilization, man has used biological warfare against its 
enemies, both individual and in mass. In the year 1155, Emperor Barbarossa poisoned 
water wells with human bodies in Tortona, Italy. In 1763, the British distributed blankets 
from smallpox patients to native Americans in the New World.1 In the 1930s, Japanese 
scientists developed modernized biological weapons. During World War II, both the 
United States and Britain developed biological weapons, including botulinum toxin, 
encephalitis virus, staph enterotoxin, anthrax, and other deadly agents.2 More than ever, 
the 21st century threat of biological warfare persists. 
Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It’s a threat to every nation that 
loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some 
rogue states already have them....It’s important that we confront these real 
threats to our country and prepare for future emergencies.3 
The signing of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
fueled the emergence of the public health discipline into the homeland security (HLS) 
arena. The act called for the department’s collaboration with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the Attorney General, in determining threats posed to our 
nation’s welfare by biological agents.4 This emphasis on the threat of biological terrorism 
was largely motivated by the October 2001 anthrax attacks that lingered fresh in the 
minds of an anxious and frightened nation, still psychologically bruised and battered by 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
1 Friedrich Frischknecht, “The History of Biological Warfare,” EMBO Reports 4, no. 6S (2003): S47–
S52.  
2 Ibid., S48. 
3 George W. Bush, as quoted in “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” The White House, 2004, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html. 
4 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, (2002): H.R. 5005.  
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In the immediate years to follow, the perception of the threat of biological 
terrorism persisted. In February, 2004, President George W. Bush warned the nation that: 
“armed with a single vial of a biological agent, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, 
could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace. America, and the 
entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the 
danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose.”5 At the direction of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10, the first Biological Threat Risk Assessment (BTRA) 
was conducted in 2006, and was intended to serve as a focal point for the establishment 
of a national biodefense strategy.6 Although the computer based probabilistic risk 
assessment tool used is not without controversy, the 2006 BTRA assessed the risk 
associated with the intentional release of 28 biological agents previously identified by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).7 Based on its stability and lethality, 
Bacillus anthracis, the bacteria that causes anthrax, has emerged as a favorite among 
scientists as a potential biological weapons agent.8 Although pandemic illness of new and 
historic origin continues to plague the world, it is the threat of the deliberate release of a 
biological agent that drives our nation’s preparedness efforts.9 
The establishment of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) has been a key 
federal health and medical preparedness initiative. This federal asset resulted from an 
expansion of the former National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS), and was created by 
the CDC as directed by Congress in 1999. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, the stockpile was renamed as the SNS, and responsibility for overall stockpile 
5 Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological 
Agent Risk Analysis, Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008), 172.  
6 Larry D. Brandt, Homeland Security R&D Roadmapping—Risk-Based Methodological Options 
(Livermore, CA: Sandia National Laboratories, 2008).  
7 Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological 
Agent Risk Analysis, Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change, 
172. 
8 David R. Franz, “Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack,” Molecular Aspects of Medicine 30, no. 6 
(2009): 503–510.  
9 Ibid., 506. 
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management was transferred to HHS, and then to DHS in May 2003.10 The mission of 
the Department of the Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) program is to provide a re-
supply of large quantities of essential medical materiel to states and communities during 
an emergency.11 Today, the SNS can deliver large quantities of medications and medical 
supplies to anywhere in the United States and its territories within 12 hours of the federal 
decision to deploy. As an additional preparedness measure, many states and regions have 
elected to purchase and maintain similar medical countermeasure (MCM) stockpiles 
locally. Theses stockpiles, consisting primarily of antivirals and antibiotics, are a means 
of rapid access to critical medications necessary for use as post-exposure prophylaxis 
(PEP) before the arrival of SNS assets.12  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Region III Health and Medical Task Force, the primary advisory body for 
public health and medical preparedness efforts in the Baltimore Metropolitan region, 
utilized 2008 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding to establish a stockpile of 
antibiotic medications. These medications were intended to be used prophylactically to 
treat first responders/first receivers and their families in the event of an anthrax attack. 
The impetus behind this initiative was to maintain a viable and resilient workforce within 
the public health arena, so that providers remained available to respond as needed within 
their respective communities, particularly during declared states of emergency when call 
volumes are significantly increased. Similarly, many state and local jurisdictions 
throughout the nation have elected to stockpile medications in an effort to reduce the 
morbidity and mortality by making PEP immediately available.13 
10 Stephen D. Prior, Who You Gonna Call? Responding to a Medical Emergency with the Strategic 
National Stockpile (Washington, DC: National Defense University Washington, DC Center for Technology 
and National Security Policy, 2004).  
11 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Office of Public 
Health Preparedness and Response, last updated July 10, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/stock 
pile.htm. 
12 Brooke Courtney et al., “Maximizing State and Local Medical Countermeasure Stockpile 
Investments through the Shelf-Life Extension Program,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 7, no. 1 (2009): 
101–107. 
13 Victor W. Sidel, Hillel W. Cohen, and Robert M. Gould, “Good Intentions and the Road to 
Bioterrorism Preparedness,” American Journal of Public Health 91, no. 5 (2001): 716.  
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Unfortunately, the practice of procuring and maintaining local stockpiles does not 
come without sacrifices. Some have questioned the efficiency of this practice in light of 
the rapid availability of resources from the SNS, and the daunting logistical and 
administrative demands of maintaining local stockpiles. No best practice has been 
established, as there appears to be little consensus or federal guidance regarding the 
appropriate levels of inventories that should be maintained.14 Obtaining stakeholder buy-
in and funding for the initial purchase of prophylactic medications can be a difficult task, 
as HLS funding streams continue to diminish. Strict environmentally controlled and 
secure storage facilities must be established to properly maintain medications within the 
cache. From an administrative standpoint, localities maintaining these stockpiles must 
develop sound activation, delivejry, and distribution protocols. Lastly, there is no 
universal model for the rotation of these medications prior to their expiration, or 
alternatively, for their inclusion in expiry extension programs aimed at maximizing shelf 
life.15 
An act of bioterrorism has significant potential to result in severe illness and death 
to masses. Without sufficient PEP, the public health infrastructure could be crippled 
through the drastic reduction of the first responder and healthcare workforce. High rates 
of workforce absenteeism could result in decreased surge capacity capabilities. The stress 
to the healthcare system would only be exacerbated by an increased influx of ill and 
worried well, resulting from a lack of adequate PEP for the civilian population. State and 
local jurisdictions must carefully consider the costs and benefits of the various models 
available for the provision of PEP, based on locally prioritized criteria. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In an effort to assist state and local level planners in assessing the adequacy of 
their bioterrorism preparedness plans, the following research questions were considered. 
14 Richard Danzig, Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What Is to Be Done? (Washington, DC: Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2003).  
15 Courtney et al., Maximizing State and Local Medical Countermeasure Stockpile Investments 
through the Shelf-Life Extension Program, 101–107. 
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• What model is best suited to provide the most efficient and cost effective 
PEP in the event of an anthrax attack? 
• How can decision makers evaluate competing models given variation in 
perceived needs and resources available to meet those needs? 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the October 2001 anthrax attacks, substantial funding and emergency 
planning resources have been allocated the expansion of pre-positioned MCMs, 
specifically antibiotic stockpiles, at the federal, state and local levels. This expansion is 
largely attributed to the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act, signed by President George W. Bush in June 2002.16 This act not only 
authorized increased funding for public health preparedness, but also called for an 
improved ability to treat diseases associated with bioterrorism, and an acceleration of the 
process to develop MCMs. Unfortunately, a lack of specific federal guidance has resulted 
in a fragmented approach throughout the nation that has yet to identify the most 
appropriate means of providing a timely, sustainable, and cost-effective model for the 
provision of PEP.17 As a result, portions of our nation are left reliant solely upon the 
availability of the SNS for the provision of PEP. Creating effective policy to mitigate the 
consequences of an anthrax attack requires data. A comparative analysis of current 
literature will assist in determining the appropriateness of a PEP model for a given 
jurisdiction.  
B. IDENTIFYING RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This review contains peer reviewed journal articles and government reports from 
2001 through the present. Articles were obtained using various electronic databases 
including EBSCO, Wiley, Francis and Taylor, Medline Plus and PubMed. The Homeland 
Security Digital Library (HSDL) was also searched for previously published theses. 
Additional grey literature journal articles were found via Google Scholar searches using 
the terms: medical countermeasures, bioterrorism planning, first responder prophylaxis, 
16 Elin A. Gursky and Gregory Bice, “Assessing a Decade of Public Health Preparedness: Progress on 
the Precipice?” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 1 (2012): 
55–65.  
17 Danzig, Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What Is to Be Done?  
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anthrax, post-exposure prophylaxis, public health preparedness, public health policy 
implementation, political acceptance, and Strategic National Stockpile. Literature was 
selected for inclusion if it contained information regarding the provision of prophylactic 
treatment for either first responders or the general public in the event of an act of 
bioterrorism, or if it contained recommendations based on specific PEP models. 
Literature was also collected if there was relevance to stockpile sustainment, cost 
effectiveness and the psycho-social implications of public health policy implementation. 
The following sections review literature on public health disaster planning and 
preparedness specific to the use of B. anthracis as a weapon of bioterrorism. 
Recommendations for PEP treatment, an analysis of proposed and currently employed 
PEP acquisition models, and psychological and sociological factors effecting political 
and social acceptance of public health policy are discussed. 
C. CLINICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEP TREATMENT 
1. Medication and Dosage 
In attempting to determine the appropriate quantities required for the provision of 
PEP to a given geographical region, it is first necessary to understand the recommended 
clinical management of exposure to anthrax. Currently, the CDC recommends 
prophylaxis for all asymptomatic adult patients, ≥18 years of age, with suspected 
exposure to B. anthracis spores, with 60 days of oral doxycycline or ciprofloxican.18 
Additionally, a 3-dose series of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) is recommended for 
long-term protection after exposure to anthrax.19 Whether or not vaccination occurs, oral 
prophylaxis should be sustained for the full 60 days, by the administration of either 
ciprofloxican 500 mg every 12 hours, or doxycycline 100 mg every 12 hours.20 This 
recommendation is supported by multiple studies, including an animal study in which a 
18 Katherine A. Hendricks et al., “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Expert Panel Meetings 
on Prevention and Treatment of Anthrax in Adults,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 20, no. 2 (February 
2014), doi: 10.3201/eid2002.130687. 
19 Jennifer Gordon Wright et al., “Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the United States,” Morbid Mortal Wkly 
Rep 59, no. rr06 (2010): 1–30.  
20 Hendricks et al., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Expert Panel Meetings.  
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monkey developed anthrax 58 days post-exposure, demonstrating that anthrax spores can 
persist for prolonged periods in a host. That same study, also demonstrated that as many 
as 90% of the test cases survived if ciprofloxican or doxycycline were administered for a 
period that exceeds the length of time in which the level of persistent spores remaining 
the in the body falls to less than an infectious dose.21 Once the medications to be used for 
PEP are identified and the recommended dosages are calculated, other factors, such as 
exposure area and distribution capabilities must be considered in determining the 
quantities needed for PEP.  
2. Exposure Area—Determining Who Gets Treated 
Very little literature currently exists on determining the exposure area in the event 
of an aerosolized anthrax spore disbursement. In a 2007 article, “Modeling Responses to 
Anthrax and Smallpox Attacks,” it is suggested that due to the variability of factors, such 
as wind speed/direction and humidity, mode of disbursement, and the historical 
inaccuracy of plume modeling, that it is often more efficient to provide PEP to an entire 
population rather than to take the time to determine who has and who has not been 
exposed.22 Plume modeling is conducted using computer models that simulate the 
downwind expansion of a pollution plume using information about the wind and 
atmospheric stability. In the case of aerosolized anthrax, the accuracy of a plume model is 
highly dependent upon variables, such as the amount of anthrax released, characteristics 
of the spores, and the exact location and mode of dispersal.23 In the event of an anthrax 
attack, many of these variables are unknown. This same article, however, also provides a 
graphical interpretation of the results of delaying the distribution of antibiotics as a result 
of identifying a plume area. 
Consideration of this data highlights the impact that the use of plume modeling 
can have on the determination of the quantities of medications necessary for PEP. Based 
21 Arthur M. Friedlander et al., “Postexposure Prophylaxis Against Experimental Inhalation Anthrax,” 
The Journal of Infectious Diseases 167, no. 5 (May 1993): 1239–1243.  
22 Diane C. Jamrog, Michael P. Shatz, and Cassandra Smith, “Modeling Responses to Anthrax and 
Smallpox Attacks,” Lincoln Laboratory Journal 17, no. 1 (2007): 115–129.  
23 Dean A. Wilkening, “Sverdlovsk Revisited: Modeling Human Inhalation Anthrax,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103, no. 20 (May 16, 2006): 7589–7594.  
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on the model in Figure 1, plume modeling would change the distribution population from 
2.1 million people to 120,000 people, thus substantially reducing the required number of 
antibiotics necessary for distribution.24 Based on findings from the study of the 
accidental 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax release in Russia, researchers have predicted that a 1-
kg release of an anthrax preparation could contain more than 1012 spores.25 However, 
others, such as UCLA Professor Dr. Ronald Brookmeyer, pointed out that dispersal 
factors, such as the type of spore preparation, method of release, and building insulation, 
are all critical factors to be considered in determining exposurearea.26 Such variability 
has led many locals to the conclusion that it is simply more time and resource efficient to 
provide PEP to an entire population, rather that attempt to determine an exact exposure 
area. 
 
Figure 1.  Fatalities are expressed as a function of delay to distribute 
antibiotics, assuming distribution to all 2.1 million people in a 
metropolitan area (solid line) and to only the 120,000 people estimated 
to be in the anthrax plume (dashed line) at a rate of 700,000 people per 
day. 
24 Jamrog, Shatz, and Smith, Modeling Responses to Anthrax and Smallpox Attacks, 115–129. 
25 Wilkening, “Sverdlovsk Revisited: Modeling Human Inhalation Anthrax,” 7589–7594.  
26 Ron Brookmeyer, Elizabeth Johnson, and Robert Bollinger, “Public Health Vaccination Policies for 
Containing an Anthrax Outbreak,” Nature 432, no. 7019 (2004): 901–904.  
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3. Distribution/Dispensing—How Soon Should PEP Be Administered? 
As the majority of the literature agrees, time is of the essence when distributing 
PEP in the event of aerosolized anthrax exposure. Factors affecting the time to 
distribution include detection, medication accessibility (the focus of this review) and 
dispensing capabilities. Dr. Brockmeyer addressed this issue by supporting the findings 
of Wein et al. in stating that minimizing the delay until initiation of antibiotic prophylaxis 
is key to containing an anthrax outbreak.27 To reinforce this statement, a 2006 study 
identified local dispensing capacity as the critical determinant of mortality following 
anthrax bioterrorism, however it is important to note that this statement was based upon 
the reported rapid availability of regional inventories.28 It is worth noting that unlimited 
accessibility is of no benefit if dispensing capabilities are not adequate. Because data on 
human exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis is limited, uncertainty remains regarding the 
incubation period. In Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, Claire Stroud et al. discuss 
the impact that defining the minimum incubation period (time from exposure until the 
initial presentation of symptoms) has on decision-making about prepositioning 
antibiotics.29 The average incubation period reported by this study and numerous others 
is four days for inhalational anthrax.30 Despite these findings however, a scenario-based 
exercise conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area revealed that the initiation of PEP 
on Day 5 after an attack, as opposed to on Day 2, resulted in an increase in mortality from 
28,612 to 69,136.31  
27 Lawrence M. Wein, David L. Craft, and Edward H. Kaplan, “Emergency Response to an Anthrax 
Attack,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100, no. 7 
(April 1, 2003): 4346–4351.  
28 Dena M. Bravata et al., “Reducing Mortality from Anthrax Bioterrorism: Strategies for Stockpiling 
and Dispensing Medical and Pharmaceutical Supplies,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, 
Practice, and Science 4, no. 3 (2006): 244–262.  
29 Clare Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax (Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2012).  
30 Daniel A. Sweeney et al., “Anthrax Infection,” American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care 
Medicine 184, no. 12 (2011): 1333–1341.  
31 Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., “Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies to a Large-
Scale Anthrax Attack on the Chicago Metropolitan Area: Impact of Timing and Surge Capacity,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 3 (2012): 264–279.  
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D. MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE ACQUISITION MODELS 
In the United States, supplies for response to bioterrorism are held at the local, 
state and national level.32 Anthrax exposure requires prophylaxis by oral antibiotics 
promptly after exposure, optimally within 48 hours, and before symptoms arise.33 Figure 
2 illustrates the basic MCM distribution and dispensing strategies currently in place in the 
United States. Although there are many components of systems for bioterrorism 
response, few have been evaluated for their ability to meet this goal.34 A review of the 
literature relevant to each of the four proposed models follows. 
 
Figure 2.  Basic MCM Distribution and Dispensing Strategies35 
32 Gregory S. Zaric et al., “Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism,” Medical 
Decision Making 28, no. 3 (2008): 332–350.  
33 Bruce M. Altevogt, Miriam Davis, and Marnina S. Kammersell, Dispensing Medical 
Countermeasures for Public Health Emergencies: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2008).  
34 Dena M. Bravata et al., “Regionalization of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response,” Evidence 
Report/Technology Assessment (Summary) (96), no. 96 (April 2004): 1–7.  
35 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 70. 
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1. Local Stockpiling 
In a 2008 article, “Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism,” 
the authors developed a compartmental model to evaluate costs and benefits of various 
strategies for pre-attack stockpiling. The model was implemented in an Excel spreadsheet 
with an interface to facilitate data entry. Information was entered about local population 
size and local inventory stockpiles. Assumptions about the attack size, the chance of 
attack, the rate of detection, and assumptions about dispensing capacity were also input. 
Based on scenarios using these models to increase locally held inventories of PEP by 10-
fold and twenty-fold, the study concluded that stockpiling large local inventories of 
pharmaceutical supplies is not likely to effectively reduce mortality.36 A weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) tabletop exercise conducted in Spokane, Washington, in May 
2000, recommended that if financially feasible, communities like Spokane may need to 
establish and maintain enough pharmaceutical stockpiles to remain self-sufficient for at 
least 24 hours.37 In the abovementioned 2008 study, however, this was not seen as 
practical, because locals are limited by their own dispensing capabilities, and are 
therefore better served by regional or national inventories.38 While some communities 
throughout the United States have established large local stockpiles, others hold no 
antibiotic inventory for response to bioterrorism and plan to rely solely on the SNS.39  
The City Readiness Initiative (CRI) is a public health preparedness program 
funded by HHS.40 In their 2004 Alternative Dispensing Guide, the CRI identified the 
limited viability of medications as a prohibitive factor in maintaining local 
pharmaceutical stockpiles.41 This problem of expired medications is also referenced in 
36 Zaric et al., “Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism,” 332–350.  
37 Colleen M. Terriff and Amy M. Tee, “Citywide Pharmaceutical Preparation for Bioterrorism,” 
American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 58, no. 3 (2001): 233–237.  
38 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism, 332–350. 
39 Ibid., 333. 
40 Henry H. Willis et al., Initial Evaluation of the Cities Readiness Initiative (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, Health, 2009), 52.  
41 Patrick J. Lindner, “CRI Alternative Dispensing Guide: A Collection of Model Practices and Pilot 
Projects,” National Association of City and County Health Officials (2006): 10, http://www.Naccho.Org/ 
Topics/Emergency/Documents/AlternativeDispensin gGuide_Final_000.Pdf. 
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literature examining the application of the Shelf Life Extension Program (SLEP) to state 
and local MCM stockpiles in an attempt to optimize the value of medications.,42  
2. Partnership Storage/Rotation Agreements 
One possible solution offered for the problem of expired medications is presented 
in the option of partnering with private-sector entities for the rotation of state and local 
stockpile materials.43 The 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) study conducted by Claire 
Stroud et al., suggested that national guidance be provided to address the range of roles 
that private-sector partners could play in MCM distribution and dispensing.44 While the 
practice of rotating medications has been posed as a potential solution, one 2009 
feasibility study found that the number of doses used annually in a local hospital 
pharmacy amounted to only 2–3% of the total antibiotic cache quantities needed to 
provide coverage to hospital employees and their families.45 A similar experience had 
been noted in 2007 when a Baltimore UASI working group issued an Invitation for Bid, 
inviting vendors to submit a proposal for the rotation of antibiotics contained in a local 
prophylactic cache. None of the responding vendors was able to provide the service based 
on the quantities of medications to be rotated.46 A 2003 article published in the Journal 
of Toxicology identified the use of a local pharmaceutical distribution company as a 
fiscally responsible means of providing PEP based upon a collaborative project with a 
Pennsylvania Metropolitain Medical Response System (MMRS) working group.47 The 
article cites 24-hour availability via emergency pager, as well as credentialed drivers who 
are familiar with the contents and equipment as advantages of working with a 
42 Courtney et al., Maximizing State and Local Medical Countermeasure Stockpile Investments, 101–
107; Robbe C. Lyon et al., “Stability Profiles of Drug Products Extended Beyond Labeled Expiration 
Dates,” Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences 95, no. 7 (2006): 1549–1560.  
43 Lindner, CRI Alternative Dispensing Guide, 20.  
44 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 9.  
45 J. J. Lee, S. J. Johnson and M. J. Sohmer, “Guide for Mass Prophylaxis of Hospital Employees in 
Preparation for a Bioterrorist Attack,” American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy: AJHP: Official 
Journal of the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists 66, no. 6 (March 15, 2009): 570–575.  
46 Courtney et al., Maximizing State and Local Medical Countermeasure Stockpile Investments 
through the Shelf-Life Extension Program, 106.  
47 Rita Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 
Clinical Toxicology 41, no. 1 (2003): 17–21.  
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manufacturer. This article discouraged the option of a user-managed inventory (UMI) 
model where dual-use medications would be stored and distributed in hospital 
pharmacies, due to the burdens associated with maintaining accurate stock availabilities 
within the facilities, and the overwhelming stress inherently placed on a hospital during a 
public health emergency.48 The UMI model is described more recently in a 2012 article 
as a developing concept that can “enhance MCM distribution and dispensing by 
supporting the activity of the SNS and increasing the capacity of state and local 
responses.”49 The article suggests the use of Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA) 
facilities, as opposed to local community hospitals, to create a supply line of MCMs. This 
article goes on to state however that to be a viable solution, the shelf life of the 
medication must be long enough to allow the amount of material in the supply line to be 
consumed by the community through normal business operations. Some jurisdictions 
have found this to be a limiting factor as antibiotics are now prescribed more restrictively 
due to the emergence of antibiotic resistant strains of bacteria, attributed to the over-use 
of antibiotics, such as ciprofloxacin and doxycycline.50 
3. Pre-Event Distribution of PEP to First Responders 
Recent publications, such as a 2011 Institute for Systems Research technical 
report, demonstrate that there is still no clear guidance on the rapid distribution of 
antibiotics in response to an anthrax attack. As a result, multiple models have been 
proposed for the acquisition and subsequent distribution of antibiotics for PEP.51 
Recognizing the predicted overwhelming burden on points of dispensing (POD), some 
literature advocates for the pre-event distribution of pharmaceuticals to individual 
48 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 19. 
49 C. Norman Coleman et al., “User-Managed Inventory: An Approach to Forward-Deployment of 
Urgently Needed Medical Countermeasures for Mass-Casualty and Terrorism Incidents,” Disaster 
Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 6, no. 04 (2012): 408–414.  
50 Robert Austin et al., “Hidden Complexity in Bacterial Evolution,” Bulletin of the American Physical 
Society (2014).  
51 Michelle Houck and Jeffrey Herrmann, Predicting the Impact of Placing Pre-Event 
Pharmaceuticals for Anthrax (College Park, MD: Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, 
2011).  
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households for use as directed by local health authorities.52 This concept was examined 
in a 2006 partnership study conducted by the CDC and the Missouri Department of 
Health and Senior Services examining, among other things, the ability of households to 
maintain MedKits in the home as directed, and to reserve medications for emergency 
use.53 The study contracted with a local physician to provide medical screening for the 
study, comprised of participants evenly distributed among community health clinic, 
corporate, and first responder cohorts. Once medically cleared, a MedKit was sent via 
FedEx to 13,289 persons in 4,259 households. Study participants were instructed not to 
use the medications unless directed to do so, and were asked to return the medications 
months later.54 Follow-up interviews were conducted at randomly assigned two-, four- 
and eight-month intervals to assess social factors, such as awareness and willingness to 
purchase MedKits. Public health officials initially expressed strong opposition to the 
project due to the potential for adverse events attributed to self-medication and the 
development of antibiotic resistance.55 Despite these concerns, the study revealed that 
individually issued MedKits were returned unopened in 97% of the cases, and that only 
four of the study participants had ingested the pills for another reason. Over 75% of the 
respondents reported an increase in awareness for the need to be prepared between 
baseline and follow-up interviews. Additionally, 85% reported a willingness to purchase 
a Medkit for their household at an average purchase price of $23. In 2011, the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness (ASPR) conducted a public engagement initiative 
in Seattle and King County, Washington to develop a better understanding of the goals, 
52 Houck and Herrmann, Predicting the Impact of Placing Pre-Event Pharmaceuticals for Anthrax, 2. 
53 “CDC’s Division of Strategic National Stockpile Emergency MedKit Evaluation Study Summary,” 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November 15, 2007, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cri/pdf/med 
kit-evaluation-summary-2007updated.pdf. 
54 Houck and Herrmann, Predicting the Impact of Placing Pre-Event Pharmaceuticals, 2.  
55 George W. Korch Jr., “Doxycycline MedKits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax 
Attack,” U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response, April 2, 2012, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting 
Materials/Drugs/Anti-InfectiveDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM299211.pdf.  
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needs and behaviors of the public in response to a biological incident.56 The findings of 
this initiative clearly demonstrated the utility of public engagement in the development of 
medical countermeasure systems, and also supported the 2006 Missouri study in that the 
public felt confident in their abilities to maintain individually issued medications for use 
only under the direction of a public health official.57 
4. The Strategic National Stockpile for the Provision of PEP 
According to the CDC, the SNS was developed with the intension of providing 
“medicine and medical supplies to protect the American public if there is a public health 
emergency (terrorist attack, flu outbreak, earthquake) severe enough to cause local 
supplies to run out.”58 Similarly, the other literature reviewed reinforced this notion that 
the SNS is not intended as a first response tool.59 However, in 2012, the Anticipated 
Responsibilities of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in the Year 2020 report stated 
that in a survey of 300 state and local organizations, it was found that > 90% are 
dependent upon the SNS for MCM.60 Factors contributing to state and local reliance on 
the SNS may include a lack of available funding to purchase regional or local stockpiles, 
or a lack of the logistics and infrastructure necessary to maintain, activate and distribute 
the stockpile. Additionally, the SNS has demonstrated efficiency during deployments to 
events, such as those of September 11, 2001, when the program’s 12-hour Push Packages 
reached the New York City area within seven hours of request, despite travel 
restrictions.61  
56 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response, Public Input on Medical Countermeasures Seattle and King County, Washington, Executive 
Summary ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2012).  
57 Ibid. 
58 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
59 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 71; Prior, Who You Gonna Call?, 3. 
60 National Biodefense Science Board and the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response 
Board of Scientific Counselors, Anticipated Responsibilities of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in the 
Year 2020: An Examination with Recommendations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2012).  
61 Nicki Pesik, Sue Gorman, and Wayne D. Williams, “The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 
Program: An Overview and Perspective for the Pacific Islands,” Pacific Health Dialog 9, no. 1 (2002): 
109–114.  
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E. MODEL EVALUATION CRITERIA 
1. Timeliness of Response 
In reviewing the literature, there were several factors to be considered in assessing 
the time to delivery of PEP in the event of an anthrax attack. Even states, regions or local 
jurisdictions that have sufficient quantities of PEP stockpiled must consider the logistics 
involved in getting the medications from their storage location to the POD. Those 
locations that do not have local stockpiles must consider the time associated with 
operations at receipt, staging and storage (RSS) sites when receiving materials from the 
SNS, in addition to transport time to PODs. A 2012 study on the location-allocation of 
stockpiles cited three noticeable delays in receiving and distributing assets from the SNS: 
the delay by the state in requesting federal assets, the delay in the federal process that 
releases assets only upon the declaration of a disaster, and the time it takes to rapidly 
move supplies from the SNS stockpile to where they are needed.62 Figure 3 provides an 
illustration of the existing framework for the distribution of SNS assets. 
62 Jomon Aliyas Paul and Govind Hariharan, “Location-Allocation Planning of Stockpiles for 
Effective Disaster Mitigation,” Annals of Operations Research 196, no. 1 (2012): 469–490.  
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Figure 3.  Illustration of existing framework for the distribution of SNS assets 
While the efficiency of POD operations is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
important to acknowledge that although medications for PEP may reach a designated 
POD, they are not available for distribution until the POD is sufficiently staffed to 
perform the distribution; the availability of staffing must therefore be considered when 
assessing time to delivery.63  
2. Cost 
The literature reviewed cited numerous factors to be considered in determining 
the cost effectiveness of local stockpiling. In a study published in 2008, Zaric et al. listed 
factors beyond the initial purchase price to consider such as the annual maintenance 
costs, which include replacement, rotation and storage fees.64 This same study found it 
more cost effective to increase local dispensing capacity then to increase local antibiotic 
63 Sinan Khan and Anke Richter, “Dispensing Mass Prophylaxis-the Search for the Perfect Solution,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 8, art. 3 (February 2012). 
64 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism, 332–350. 
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inventories, as the ability to dispense medications rapidly is most frequently the limiting 
factor in the provision of PEP. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of a 2006 
study published in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, that further quantified the statement by 
suggesting that in the event of a large attack, local stockpiling should be considered cost 
effective only if the annual probability of an attack is greater than 0.0004.65 
Still another factor to consider in determining cost effectiveness is the 
recommended course of post-exposure prophylactic treatment. In addition to oral post-
exposure antimicrobial prophylaxis, the more recent literature reviewed recommends the 
administration of the 3-dose anthrax vaccine, AVA, as the most cost-effective response 
strategy.66 While the CDC continues to recommend a 60-day course of antimicrobial 
treatment in combination with the vaccine regimen, a 2006 panel study done by the 
National Institutes of Health claimed that animal studies have shown that post-exposure 
antimicrobial administration for just 14 days provided complete protection against 
inhalational anthrax when combined with 3-dose vaccination therapy.67 Similar findings 
were also noted in a 2005 comparison study conducted by Dr. Robert Fowler on the cost 
effectiveness of defending against bioterrorism.68 A 2011 study, Cost-Effectiveness 
Comparison of Response Strategies to a Large-Scale Anthrax Attack on the Chicago 
Metropolitan Area, also concluded that the optimal cost effective response strategy is to 
provide antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination for all exposed people within 48 hours of 
the recognition of a large-scale attack.69 
A relatively limited amount of literature was located on the extension of 
pharmaceutical shelf life for containing MCM sustainment costs. The most recent and 
65 Bravata et al., “Reducing Mortality from Anthrax Bioterrorism: Strategies for Stockpiling and 
Dispensing Medical and Pharmaceutical Supplies,” 244–262.  
66 Kyriacou et al., Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies, 264–279.  
67 Nicholas J. Vietri et al., “Short-Course Postexposure Antibiotic Prophylaxis Combined with 
Vaccination Protects Against Experimental Inhalational Anthrax,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 103, no. 20 (2006): 7813–7816.  
68 Robert A. Fowler et al., “Cost-Effectiveness of Defending Against Bioterrorism: A Comparison of 
Vaccination and Antibiotic Prophylaxis Against Anthrax,” Annals of Internal Medicine 142, no. 8 (2005): 
601–610.  
69 Kyriacou et al., Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies, 264–279.  
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relevant article found was published in 2009 and titled Maximizing State and Local 
Medical Countermeasure Stockpile Investments through the Shelf-Life Extension 
Program.70 The article references prior data on drug stability profiles and concludes that 
efficient and cost effective management of state and local medical countermeasure 
stockpiles is dependent upon their inclusion in the federally administered SLEP, or a 
similarly managed program. The SLEP is a Department of Defense (DOD)/Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) administered fee-for-service program, and is intended for 
large federal stockpiles of military significance or contingency use products.71 The DOD 
and DSNS both maintain large stockpiles of medications and vaccines to ensure that both 
military and civilian populations have access to antidotes and treatments in the event of a 
medical emergency.72 The FDA and DOD developed this program to save federal dollars 
by extending the shelf life of pharmaceuticals beyond the manufacturer’s expiration date. 
All testing for extensions is done at FDA test facilities.73 The claim that the cost-effective 
management of stockpiles is dependent upon inclusion in such a program is supported by 
research revealing that stability testing can extend the life of pharmaceutical products far 
beyond their manufacturer expiration dates.74 Ciprofloxacin, a primary pharmaceutical 
component of the SNS, is provided as an example of a medication included in a national 
SLEP implemented in Israel that resulted in a substantial savings in MCM stockpiling.75 
70 Courtney et al., Maximizing State and Local Medical Countermeasure Stockpile Investments, 101–
107.  
71 Moran Bodas et al., “Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) As a Significant Contributor to 
Strategic National Stockpile Maintenance: The Israeli Experience with Ciprofloxacin,” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 2 (2012): 182–187.  
72 Leissa B. Food and Drug Administration. “Shelf Life Extension Program,” presentation at Federal, 
State, and Local Public Health Preparedness Meeting, Baltimore, MD, December 14–15, 2010, 
www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/ucm247676.htm.  
73 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Implementation Plan for the National 
Health Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2012).  
74 Lyon et al., “Stability Profiles of Drug Products Extended Beyond Labeled Expiration Dates,” 
1549–1560.  
75 Bodas et al., “Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) As a Significant Contributor to Strategic 
National Stockpile Maintenance: The Israeli Experience with Ciprofloxacin,” 182–187.  
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3. Logistics 
Some of the challenges associated with MCM stockpiling were highlighted during 
2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications Committee on Homeland 
Security. Although substantial funding has been allocated to the development and 
acquisition of MCM, the testimony cited a high failure rate in research and development, 
and difficulties meeting regulatory requirements as ongoing obstacles to the development 
of new MCMs.76 These and other challenges, such as a lack of local surge capacity, are 
detailed in a 2002 article published in the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and 
Infectious Diseases.77 These articles describe difficulties in obtaining central storage, the 
burden of cache maintenance, and the cost of replenishment of expired medications as 
other matters to be considered in determining the feasibility of sustaining local 
stockpiles.78 A 2006 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism study examined logistical factors, 
such as dispensing capacity, the number of individuals requiring PEP, local inventories 
and delays in detection.79 The results of the study suggested that state and local 
jurisdictions focus efforts on maximizing local dispensing capacity, strategies that 
encourage adherence to PEP regimens, and technologies to identify those at risk for 
exposure. In 2008, Zaric et al. used a compartmental model to evaluate the logistics of a 
bioterrorism response supply chain.80 Logistical factors incorporated included antibiotic 
inventories, as well as prophylaxis-dispensing strategies and capacities. Similar to the 
2006 study, this article cited local dispensing capacity and the number of unexposed 
76 Cynthia Bascetta, Public Health Preparedness: Developing and Acquiring Medical 
Countermeasures Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Agents (GAO-11-567T) 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2011).  
77 R. Havlak, S.E. Gorman, and S. A. Adams, “Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical 
Stockpile to Respond to a Terrorist Event,” Clinical Microbiology and Infection 8, no. 8 (2002): 529–533.  
78 Dan Hanfling, “Equipment, Supplies, and Pharmaceuticals: How Much might it Cost to Achieve 
Basic Surge Capacity?” Academic Emergency Medicine 13, no. 11 (2006): 1232–1237.  
79 Bravata et al., Reducing Mortality from Anthrax Bioterrorism, 244–262.  
80 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism, 332–350.  
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individuals requesting PEP as the most significant factors influencing morbidity and 
mortality in the event of an anthrax attack.81 
Previous efforts to establish an activation and deployment plan for a locally held 
PEP cache in the Baltimore metropolitan region revealed the logistical challenges 
resulting from a lack of properly trained and credentialed personnel to transport 
medications in the event of a large-scale biological event. Personnel from first responder 
organizations that housed the stockpile were not available to serve as transporters in 
already over-burdened jurisdictions. Furthermore, personnel from outside the jurisdiction 
were not insured to operate the housing jurisdiction’s vehicles, and lastly, local law 
enforcement agencies were not able to commit resources to providing escorts during 
medication transport.82 
4. Stakeholder Acceptance 
Transforming evidence-based public health research into public health policy is 
not an easy task, as highlighted by Petticrew et al. in a 2004 study stating, “while 
researchers would like their research to influence policy, in practice this often does not 
happen because they take little account of the needs of policymakers and of the reality of 
the policy process.”83 Principles of Emergency Management, published by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2006, define stakeholders as “people who 
have, or think they have, a personal interest in the outcome of a policy.”84 Stakeholders 
can be social groups, political groups, or economic groups, and can vary substantially in 
the power and resources that they bring to the table. The mobilization of the appropriate 
stakeholder groups is a crucial step in ensuring the adoption of policy.85 Policymakers 
engage stakeholder groups to influence relevant levels of government by presenting a 
81 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism, 334.  
82 This information is based on the personal observations of this researcher during participation in the 
Region III Health and Medical Task Force Post-exposure Prophylaxis Subcommittee.  
83 Mark Petticrew et al., “Evidence for Public Health Policy on Inequalities: 1: The Reality According 
to Policymakers,” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 58, no. 10 (October 2004): 811–816.  
84 Michael K. Lindell, Carla S. Prater, and Ronald W. Perry, “Emergency Management Stakeholders,” 
in Fundamentals of Emergency Management (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2006), 33.  
85 Ibid.  
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policy in a manner that highlights the policy’s benefit to the stakeholder and justifies 
investment in the policy. To achieve this mission comprehensively, the National 
Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) suggested developing key 
relationships with the private sector, public sector, beneficiaries, volunteer sector, 
practitioners and resource partners as stakeholders.86 A 2006 BMC Public Health 
research article showcased an example of public health and business collaboration by 
examining the case of a partnership formed between public health officials, and a 
business executive group in the Metropolitan Atlanta Region.87 Beyond the realization 
that combining government and business resources increases the opportunity for 
successful emergency preparation and response, the article cites shared objectives and 
mutual trust as key factors in the sustainment of these partnerships.  
5. Comprehensiveness 
The week-long TOPOFF-2 exercise conducted in 2003 demonstrated the 
challenge of determining a prophylaxis distribution policy for first responders and 
citizenry across local jurisdictions.88 Planners and policy makers must continuously 
assess the enormous logistical challenges associated with the distribution of PEP in a 
large metropolitan area, as well as the potential for limited quantities of the amount of 
PEP immediately available, to ensure equitable access for all citizens. Significant 
research was found on the allocation of scare medical interventions and resources. Persad 
et al. review the advantages and disadvantages of the most commonly used principles for 
the allocation of scarce resources, which include a lottery, prioritarianism approaches, 
utilitarianism approaches, and approaches that promote and reward social usefulness.89 
The writers cite the utilitarianism approach as that which has historically been used in 
86 “Engaging Partners, Stakeholders and Community Members,” National Association of County and 
City Health Officials, accessed May 23, 2014, www.naccho.org/topics/infrastructure/CHAIP/partner-
engegement.cfm.  
87 James W. Buehler, Ellen A. Whitney, and Ruth L. Berkelman, “Business and Public Health 
Collaboration for Emergency Preparedness in Georgia: A Case Study,” BMC Public Health 6, no. 1 (2006): 
1–13.  
88 Prior, Who You Gonna Call?, 12. 
89 Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Principles for Allocation of Scarce 
Medical Interventions,” The Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 423–431.  
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bioterrorism policy, providing the most good to the most people. In promoting equity of 
access through the utilitarian principle, establishing and sustaining public trust and 
effective communication is critical. During a public health emergency, diverse 
populations may require individualized approaches to ensure that messages are delivered 
appropriately.90 Within the context of bioterrorism, distrust of government has emerged 
as an issue in numerous studies. During the 2001 anthrax attack, many African American 
postal workers saw racial discrimination as the underlying explanation for the different 
treatment they received as compared to the U.S. Senate staff in the Hart Senate Office 
Building.91 In a report titled “Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for a Public Health, Not 
Law Enforcement/National Security, Approach,” the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) argues for government actions based on principles of justice and transparency.92 
In defining justice, the article states that preparation for a potential pandemic should 
ensure a fair distribution of precautions and responses, and “equal respect for the dignity 
and autonomy of each individual.” Transparency, with regard to pandemic or disaster 
preparedness, requires transparent communication of accurate information. 
F. SUMMARY 
The literature that was reviewed reinforced the notion that no national standard 
exists for the local acquisition and stockpiling of medical countermeasures. Controversy 
also exists as to whether or not this practice is even warranted, given the challenges faced 
in storing, maintaining, and activating the asset, as well as the rapid availability of the 
SNS and relatively low probability of an attack. The literature does however support that 
there is strong consensus, based on guidelines provided by the CDC, regarding the course 
of post-exposure prophylaxis treatment for those exposed to B. anthracis. Based on these 
90 Janice C. Blanchard et al., “In Their Own Words: Lessons Learned from Those Exposed to 
Anthrax,” American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 3 (2005): 489–495.  
91 Sandra Crouse Quinn, Tammy Thomas, and Carol McAllister, “Postal Workers’ Perspectives on 
Communication during the Anthrax Attack,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, 
and Science 3, no. 3 (2005): 207–215; Bradley D. Stein et al., “A Bitter Pill to Swallow: Nonadherence 
with Prophylactic Antibiotics during the Anthrax Attacks and the Role of Private Physicians,” Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 3 (2004): 175–185.  
92 George J. Annas, “Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 346, no. 17 (2002): 1337–1342.  
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guidelines, the federally administered SNS program, its mission, program objectives, and 
capabilities, are clearly defined as a means of reducing morbidity and mortality in the 
event of a public health emergency. Further research needs to be conducted regarding 
several aspects of bioterrorism preparedness in the form of PEP during an anthrax attack. 
From the literature that was reviewed, it is not clear what parameters are used in 
determining what the most appropriate model for providing PEP is for a given 
population. Further research is needed to determine if a model that is deemed to be 
appropriate and effective is universally applicable, or if there are location specific 
variables effecting the decision. These and other questions remain to be answered. While 
it is conceivable that there is no one-size-fits-all solution, more specific guidance on cost-
effective preparedness solutions would undoubtedly result in more informed, and 
consequently better-prepared communities. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. POLICY ANALYSIS 
This research evaluated the efficiency of four potential policy options for the 
management of PEP in the event of a B. anthracis anthrax attack. The policy options 
examined were the following.  
• Policy Option 1—a locally managed antibiotic medication stockpile, 
purchased, stored, sustained and deployed at the state, regional or local 
level. 
• Policy Option 2—a locally managed antibiotic medication stockpile, 
purchased and stored at the state, regional or local level, with its inventory 
sustained using a supply rotation model, managed through partnerships 
with public and/or private entities. 
• Policy Option 3—the provision of PEP to first responders/first receivers 
via medications prescribed and pre-dispensed to individual responders and 
stored in their homes. 
• Policy Option 4—reliance on the SNS as a sole source of PEP, beyond 
medications currently on hand in local commercial and hospital pharmacy 
inventories.  
B. SELECTING POLICY OPTIONS 
The policy options described below were chosen based upon their relevance as 
either current or proposed models for the provision of PEP in various jurisdictions 
throughout the nation.  
Policy Option 1: The use of a locally managed antibiotic stockpile is used by 
numerous state and local jurisdictions throughout the United States, including the 
Baltimore metropolitan region. This region was chosen for analysis based upon the 
personal observations and first-hand experiences of this researcher with regard to local 
stockpile planning, procurement and sustainment efforts.  
Policy Option 2: The second policy option evaluated was selected based on the 
fact that numerous jurisdictions throughout the nation have previously employed such a 
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model through rotation agreements with local hospital pharmacies or pharmaceutical 
distributors.  
Policy option 3: The third policy option is based upon a model that was recently 
proposed by the ASPR. This model proposes the pre-placement of prophylactic 
medications in the homes of emergency services personnel. The FDA, under an annually 
renewed emergency use authorization (EUA), has approved the use of this model, which 
is currently being considered by many state and local jurisdictions.  
Policy Option 4: The fourth and final policy option examined the reliance of the 
CDC’s SNS as a sole source for the provision of PEP, and was chosen for comparison as 
the federally coordinated model for the distribution of prophylaxis in the event of an 
anthrax incident.  
C. DATA SOURCES 
Data sources for this research included peer-reviewed literature, current 
government and non-government organization (NGO) program reports, exercise after-
action reports, jurisdiction specific policies detailing the management of PEP for a given 
population, and SNS program policies and data.  
D. TYPE AND MODE OF ANALYSIS 
This research is a policy options analysis. The steps involved included the 
analysis of the four aforementioned policy options to determine the feasibility of the 
application of each of the models in a state or local jurisdiction. The following metrics 
were used in the analysis and subsequent assessment of each of the options: 
• Timeliness of response—refers to the amount of time that lapses from the 
detection of anthrax until the availability of PEP. For the purposes of this 
study, availability was defined as directly accessible to those who have 
been exposed or potentially exposed. Factors effecting this time to 
delivery may include geographical distance, the availability of manpower 
and transportation resources, medication shortages and/or time delays 
associated with legal and regulatory procedures.93 
93 Lawrence O. Gostin, “Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and the Law,” 
Jama 295, no. 5 (2006): 554–556.  
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• Cost—the determination of cost considered the rate by which the 
investment in any particular model reduced the probability of a successful 
attack. Factors, such as procurement, storage, maintenance, sustainment 
and administrative costs, were all considered. 
• Logistics—the logistical requirements that accompany the provision of 
PEP can be extensive. Models were evaluated based on the demands 
placed on the human and non-human resources of federal, state, and local 
government organizations, as well as private industry stakeholders.  
• Stakeholder Acceptance—There are numerous organizations that comprise 
the list of stakeholders in the event of a public health emergency. 
Stakeholders can include, but are not limited to, first responders, public 
health personnel, local private industry executives, and elected officials. 
The evaluation of a PEP model based on stakeholder acceptance entailed 
the identification and subsequent assessment of all parties affected by the 
employment of a given model. Factors, such as cost, convenience, 
perception of risk, and trust in government, can all influence stakeholder 
acceptance.94  
• Comprehensiveness—refers to the overall ability of a model to provide the 
most timely PEP coverage to the greatest number of people. This criterion 
is evaluated based upon the quantity of medication available from a 
model, the mode of distribution, and the equality of access. Healthcare 
access and health outcomes are highly variable within communities, and 
are frequently unevenly distributed based on levels of income, education, 
insurance status, and ethnicity.95 A model was considered as providing 
equitable access if it provided equivalent benefits to the various groups 
within a population, and did not subject any particular group to a 
disproportionate burden that might reduce the likelihood of obtaining 
PEP.96  
A policy options matrix was used to evaluate the options based on the stated 
criteria, with relative outcome values assigned and designated as “A,” “B,” or “C.” 
E. OUTPUT 
The finished product of this analysis provides a framework by which state and 
local jurisdictions can evaluate the suitability of models for the provision of PEP in the 
94 Petticrew et al., Evidence for Public Health Policy on Inequalities, 811–816. 
95 David P. Eisenman et al., “Will Public Health’s Response to Terrorism be Fair? Racial/Ethnic 
Variations in Perceived Fairness during a Bioterrorist Event,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 3 (2004): 146–156.  
96 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 165–170.  
 29 
                                                 
event of a large-scale anthrax attack. Readers may employ these findings in evaluating 
the efficacy of their own local programs, and in determining the most appropriate PEP 
model based upon local priorities. 
 
Policy Option Timeliness Cost Logistics Stakeholder Acceptance Comprehensiveness 
1      
2      
3      
4      
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IV. POLICY OPTION 1: LOCAL STOCKPILES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 anthrax attacks thrust public health into the media spotlight, 
simultaneously highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the nation’s public health 
infrastructure. Congressional testimony and other writings revealed warnings from within 
the public health community and beyond, of the problems likely to result from a 
struggling public health system operating under a national bioterror plan, marked by 
confused lines of authority and overlapping responsibilities.97 Although these warnings 
were issued prior to 2001, it was not until the events of September 11, and the anthrax 
attacks that followed shortly thereafter, that the warnings captured the attention of state 
and local planners. With the threat of bioterrorism looming, many state and local 
jurisdictions throughout the United States sought protection in the form of the 
establishment of local PEP stockpiles.  
No national consensus exists regarding the appropriate levels of local 
pharmaceutical supply inventories.98 A 2000 WMD tabletop exercise after-action report 
recommended that local communities be self-sufficient for at least 24 hours.99 In 
contrast, a 2002 U.S. Medicine Institute for Health Studies report suggested that there 
was no recommendation for individual communities to stockpile pharmaceuticals.100 
Such conflicting guidance has resulted in inconsistency in local planning efforts 
throughout the nation.  
97 Thomas B. Cole, “When a Bioweapon Strikes, Who Will Be in Charge?” JAMA: The Journal of the 
American Medical Association 284, no. 8 (August 23–30, 2000): 944, 947–8.  
98 Bravata et al., Reducing Mortality from Anthrax Bioterrorism, 244–262.  
99 Terriff and Tee, Citywide Pharmaceutical Preparation for Bioterrorism, 233–237.  
100 U.S. Medicine Institute for Health Studies, Surge Capacity: Is It Time to Move Beyond ‘Just-in-
Time’? (Washington, DC: U.S. Medicine Institute for Health Studies, 2002).  
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B. PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
The experiences of planners from the Baltimore metropolitan region are provided 
as an example of a local stockpiling model.101 The Health and Medical Task Force of the 
Baltimore metropolitan area took a regional approach to securing antibiotics to be used 
for post-exposure prophylaxis in the event of an aerosolized anthrax attack. This region 
consists of Baltimore City, and the six surrounding emergency services jurisdictions 
(counties or municipalities). With funding provided by the UASI, the group purchased a 
three-day course of medications, consisting of 85% doxycycline and 15% ciprofloxacin. 
The determination of this quantity was based upon an estimation of the number of “first 
responders” in the region, as defined by HSPD–8 as “those individuals who in the early 
stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, 
evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined in 
section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency 
management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support 
personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during 
prevention, response, and recovery operations.”102 These numbers, provided by the 
respective discipline Task Force representatives, included personnel from law 
enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, public 
health, essential hospital personnel, public works, shelter personnel, and key agency 
leadership. The estimated number of persons was then multiplied by three to account for 
the first responders’ families, based on an average household size of three persons, 
resulting in an initial order of medication for 354,000 individuals.  
A secure and environmentally controlled storage facility was constructed, also 
with UASI funding, to house the medications for the entire region. Medications were 
ordered and upon receipt, were repackaged and relabeled in accordance with Maryland 
Board of Pharmacy laws for individual distribution in three-day courses. Activation and 
101 Information regarding this model is provided from the first-hand experiences of this researcher as 
an active member of the Region III Health and Medical Task Force, operating in Baltimore, Maryland.  
102 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness 
(Washington, DC: The White House, December 2003).  
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deployment plans were crafted with the assistance of the University of Maryland Center 
for Health and Homeland Security. 
Although unsuccessful, significant effort was made to have state and local 
pharmaceutical caches included in the federally administered SLEP prior to the cache’s 
expiration. Upon expiration, the medications must be properly destroyed and repurchased 
at the current market price. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of Response 
It would seem reasonable to assume that the pre-positioning of PEP at the local 
level would result in a relatively short amount of time required to access the medications. 
However, when assessing the timeliness of this model, it is important to consider the time 
required to access and distribute the stockpile utilizing local resources. Based on the 
activation policy in the Baltimore case for instance, it was incumbent upon the 
jurisdiction requesting the medications to initiate the activation of the stockpile utilizing 
pre-defined emergency management resource request procedures. Once approved, the 
requesting jurisdiction was responsible for providing the personnel and equipment 
necessary to retrieve the medications from the storage site and to provide secure, police 
escorted transport to the requested location. Estimations of timeliness for this model 
should consider the coordination of resources, and must also account for confounding 
factors, such as traffic delays, personnel shortages and civil unrest, which commonly 
present during a state of emergency. 
2. Cost 
The establishment, maintenance and sustainment costs associated with local 
stockpiling can vary depending upon multiple factors. The cost of medications is variable 
based upon the current market price, which is driven by primary healthcare 
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consumption.103 Additionally, larger jurisdictions are typically afforded greater discounts 
through bulk purchasing. The annual maintenance costs of stockpiled antibiotics consist 
of rotation and storage costs.104 For instance, in the previously discussed Baltimore 
example, the initial purchase price of the medications was $226,227.00. Annual 
maintenance costs were budgeted at $56,556.00 based upon an estimated 0.25 per daily 
dose. The designation of a secure and climate controlled storage facility, and 
administrative costs, such as those associated with medication re-packaging and labeling, 
are other costs that must be considered. The ability to sustain local stockpiles is 
dependent upon the anticipated availability of funding streams. Medications contained in 
many state and local stockpiles have relatively short expiration dates, as many state 
pharmacy laws mandate that expiration dates not exceed one year.105 Sustaining these 
stockpiles requires the replacement of medications, which results in associated costs to 
include disposal fees and the cost of repurchase. Given that Federal funding for HLS 
grant programs has decreased by more than 75% since the program’s inception in 2003, 
the availability of future funding seems unpredictable at best.106  
An additional cost that would be incurred with this model is the cost associated 
with the transport of the stockpile materials to the various points of distribution. This task 
could be accomplished by a private contractor, a designated state or local government 
agency, or could be shared among the jurisdictions receiving the medications. In the 
previously discussed Baltimore case, the requesting jurisdiction was responsible for 
providing secure transportation for the medications, and would incur the associated 
manpower and logistical costs. 
103 Ulrich S. Jensen et al., “Effect of Generics on Price and Consumption of Ciprofloxacin in Primary 
Healthcare: The Relationship to Increasing Resistance,” The Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 65, 
no. 6 (June 2010): 1286–1291.  
104 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response to Anthrax Bioterrorism, 332–350.  
105 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 88–89. 
106 Are We Prepared? Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants since 9/11, Senate 
Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, 1st. sess., 2014.  
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3. Logistics 
Stockpile storage sites must prevent unauthorized access, must be 
environmentally controlled so that medications are not exposed to extreme temperatures, 
and must be protected from elements, such as water damage and rodent infestation.107 
Additionally, storage sites must be easily accessible, and located in a place that provides 
for timely distribution to the coverage area. This sight may be constructed solely for this 
purpose, as was the case in the Baltimore example, or may be a leased facility. Additional 
logistical requirements to be considered are those for medication repackaging and 
labeling in accordance with state and federal laws. Because the purchase of drugs in unit-
of-dose packaging is typically cost prohibitive, it is likely that purchasers will have to 
repackage and re-label medications upon receipt.108 
4. Stakeholder Acceptance 
Political agendas can be of systemic, governmental or institutional nature.109 As 
the events of 2001 become a distant memory, policy issues, such as bioterrorism 
preparedness, are not receiving daily media attention, and are far less likely than in 2002 
to become a systemic issue among stakeholders. The current government agenda at the 
state and local level is heavily concentrated on such stressed issues as the economy, 
crime, immigration, and education, leaving bioterrorism as a back-burner issue for some 
stakeholders.110  
From the clinical perspective, healthcare experts suggest that the most effective 
strategy for mitigating the effects of a large-scale anthrax attack is believed to be the pre-
event vaccination of a large portion of the general population.111 The findings of a study 
comparing response strategies to a large-scale anthrax attack in Chicago however 
107 Havlak, Gorman, and Adams, “Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile to 
Respond to a Terrorist Event,” 529–533. 
108 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 196. 
109 Lindell et al., Emergency Management Stakeholders, 33.  
110 Liz Farmer et al., “The Top 10 Legislative Issues to Watch in 2014,” Governing, January 2014, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-2014-legislative-issues-to-watch.html.  
111 Kyriacou et al., Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies to a Large-Scale Anthrax 
Attack on the Chicago Metropolitan Area: Impact of Timing and Surge Capacity, 264–279.  
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revealed that pre-event vaccination would be cost effective only if a large-scale attack 
was a credible risk, and if there was substantial delay in public health intervention.112 
Given the current state of the economy, it seems unlikely that local and state government 
stakeholders would support such costly initiatives as pre-event vaccination, and would 
instead endorse programs, such as local stockpiling.  
At the local level, the agencies most involved with public health emergencies are 
the fire and police departments, which are first to respond to most health related 
emergencies. Some communities have a separate EMS agency, but this function is 
frequently provided by the fire department in conjunction with local hospitals and private 
ambulance companies. The possibility exists that the intentional release of a large 
quantity of a biological agent could span multiple jurisdictions and even states. For 
instance, given the ideal atmospheric conditions, an aerosolized anthrax release in the 
Washington, DC area could result in significant impact to not only Washington, DC, but 
also to portions of Maryland and Virginia. Given this possibility, one must consider the 
consequences of the availability of PEP to first responder stakeholders in one jurisdiction, 
and not in another. 
State and local level public works, transportation, and community development 
departments are important stakeholders in the mitigation process as well, as they also 
have responsibilities during the response and recovery phases.113 At the state level, 
stakeholders include the state emergency management agencies and state health, and 
human services departments also have important emergency management functions, and 
many members of these agencies belong to professional associations that lobby for 
disaster-relevant legislation.114 These agencies provide the major direction for their 
subordinate local organizations, and interact with state legislatures to provide the legal 
framework within which they function, and serve to link local governments with federal 
resources. 
112 Kyriacou et al., Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies to a Large-Scale Anthrax 
Attack on the Chicago Metropolitan Area: Impact of Timing and Surge Capacity, 264–279. 
113 Lindell et al., Emergency Management Stakeholders, 39. 
114 Ibid., 33.  
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Private stakeholders, such as community business leaders, have come to 
understand the importance of the connection of the health of the community to the health 
of their businesses. These politically influential stakeholders are therefore likely to be 
supportive of emergency management goals that diminish business interruption by 
providing the timely distribution of PEP.115 
5. Comprehensiveness 
The comprehensiveness of this model is primarily dependent upon the quantities 
of medications stockpiled. As this model utilizes PODs as a distribution mechanism, 
equality of access must also be considered. Local stockpiles are typically limited in 
quantity due to the cost of purchase and the space required for storage. These limited 
quantities frequently result in the pre-designation of stockpiles for use by local first 
responders, hospital, and emergency management personnel and their families, to ensure 
that they are ready to report to work as soon as possible.116 With public health as the 
priority, it is essential to protect individuals who provide treatment and protect the 
public’s health, as these are critical missions necessary to save lives and provide care for 
those in need.117 While many agree with the concept of priority distribution for first 
responders, concerns regarding the equality of access may arise among those who are not 
a member of these groups, and who are not advocates of the concept of triage by social 
worth.118  
The local stockpile model’s heavy reliance upon PODs for the distribution of 
medications requires that planners consider an alternate means of distribution to those 
populations for which PODs may not be easily accessible. This may include the 
physically and mentally disabled, as well as elderly and indigent populations. Likewise, it 
115 Yang Zhang, Michael K. Lindell, and Carla S. Prater, “Vulnerability of Community Businesses to 
Environmental Disasters,” Disasters 33, no. 1 (2009): 38–57.  
116 Nathaniel Hupert et al., Community-Based Mass Prophylaxis: A Planning Guide for Public Health 
Preparedness (Weill Medical College of Cornell University: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2004. 
117 Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 554–556.  
118 Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel, Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 423–
431.  
 37 
                                                 
is crucial that this model be accompanied by a strong messaging component to ensure 
equality in the clarity of messaging to all, including non-English speaking populations.119 
119 Anne Rinchiuso-Hasselmann et al., “Public Compliance with Mass Prophylaxis Guidance,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 8, no. 3 (2010): 255–263. 
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V. POLICY OPTION 2—JURISDICTIONAL CACHE 
ACQUISITION WITH THIRD PARTY INVENTORY 
MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The effective medical response to a bioterrorism attack requires planning for 
substantial resources, supplies and storage space. Stockpiling in a central repository can 
be problematic for drugs with short shelf lives, as frequent replacement is costly and 
administratively burdensome. A managed inventory model allows local, regional, or state 
jurisdictions to procure a pharmaceutical stockpile with the intent of providing PEP to a 
designated population. This model aims to manage pharmaceutical stockpiles more 
efficiently by avoiding costs due to the expiration, disposal and repurchase of expired 
medications.120 Inventory management techniques, such as UMI and distributor-managed 
inventory (DMI), can decrease costs through the rotation of MCM medications into 
routine use.  
B. PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
1. User-Managed Inventory 
The UMI concept is characterized by four key features: (1) the use of dual-utility 
MCMs; (2) storage of MCMs at multiple local or regional pharmacies, who would 
maintain a sufficient inventory, or ‘‘bubble,’’ to help meet immediate surge MCM needs; 
(3) MCMs would be managed to ensure that inventory would not expire before use, using 
first-in, first-out protocols; and (4) the UMI ‘‘bubble’’ inventory would be used locally to 
treat casualties in an emergency, including evacuees from other localities.121 Similar to 
central stockpiling and vendor-managed inventory (VMI), the ‘‘bubble’’ inventory could 
also be allocated locally to areas of greatest immediate need. The UMI model differs 
120 C. Norman Coleman et al., “User-Managed Inventory: An Approach to Forward-Deployment of 
Urgently Needed Medical Countermeasures for Mass-Casualty and Terrorism Incidents,” 408–414.  
121 C. Norman Coleman et al., “Medical Planning and Response for a Nuclear Detonation: A Practical 
Guide,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 4 (2012): 346–
71.  
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from VMI in that it does not rely on a product vendor to resupply goods when an 
inventory gets low. Instead, regular users (e.g., pharmacies) of inventory assets rotate the 
goods through daily use with the intention of avoiding expiration.122 A 2012 Disaster 
Medicine and Public Health Preparedness article provides the extensive network of 
facilities that are included within the DVA as an example of a user-managed inventory 
model.123 These facilities include Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals, community 
and hospital-based outpatient clinics, community pharmacies, and veteran centers. In the 
absence of a mass-casualty incident, dual-utility MCMs (useful for both mass casualty 
emergencies and routine medical care) are cycled through pharmacy inventories so that 
they are used prior to expiration. The daily medical use of these medications offers the 
added benefit of familiarity by those who use them for routine medical purposes.124  
2. Distributor-Managed Inventory 
The DMI model utilizes a single local distribution company for the management 
of PEP stockpile inventory, as opposed to the multiple facilities employed in the UMI 
model. An example of this model is provided in the case of a regional MMRS working 
group from Pennsylvania who developed a DMI system to maintain a regional 
pharmaceutical stockpile in the Pittsburgh area.125 With the assistance of a regional 
poison center, the group partnered with a pharmaceutical distributor, located within a 
two-hour driving radius, to store, and deliver the MCM materials. Stockpiles are also 
rotated through normal distribution channels to retailers. This system was intended to 
provide PEP to treat an at-risk population for a 24-hour period following a chemical or 
biological incident. The model employs the use of well-established distribution routes to 
guarantee that PEP medications are available at all times. Company employees provide 
122 Davis, Miriam, Megan Reeve, and Bruce Altevogt, “Reorienting and Augmenting Professional 
Approaches.” In Nationwide Response Issues After an Improvised Nuclear Device Attack, 71 (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press, 2013). 
123 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory, 408–414. 
124 Leigh Sawyer, “Where are the Countermeasures? Protecting America’s Health from CBRN 
Threats: A Report of the National Biodefense Science Board,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 203–207. 
125 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 17–
21. 
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24-hr/day, 7 day/week availability, and are familiar with warehouse contents and 
equipment operations. The limited number of potential transporters allows for the 
creation of emergency transport identities for each, to allow drivers to enter restricted 
areas.126 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of Response 
UMI and DMI models do not eliminate the need for a SNS response, but instead 
provide more immediate access to MCM resources. Both models are activated locally, 
and can therefore be activated more quickly than the SNS, as there are fewer layers of 
bureaucracy to be traversed.  
A second factor affecting the timeliness of these models is the fact that 
medications that are stored by pharmacies or distributors must be rapidly repackaged 
prior to distribution as PEP. Pharmacies typically store bulk bottles of 100 or 500 tablets 
for daily use dispensing.127 These medications must be converted to unit-of-use 
packaging to facilitate rapid dispensing to individuals as PEP; doing so requires time and 
manpower.  
a. Factors Influencing UMI Timeliness 
Although UMI resources may be stored closer than SNS assets, the time, 
manpower, and transportation resources required to distribute the medications to PODs 
can be extensive due to the high number of storage locations. Retrieval of PEP from 
numerous facilities for redistribution to PODs is likely to be time consuming, especially 
if traffic delays occur. Some proponents of UMI have touted the model as being available 
for distribution from the location at which they are stored, thereby eliminating the time 
126 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 17–
21. 
127 Havlak, Gorman, and Adams, “Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile to 
Respond to a Terrorist Event,” 529–533. 
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associated with delivery.128 Others however, have discouraged the placement of PEP 
assets at hospitals because of the increased demand for services already placed on the 
facility in the event of a public health emergency.129 
b. Factors Influencing DMI Timeliness 
The timeliness of DMI assets is highly dependent upon the location of the 
distributor storage facility, relative to PODs. As mentioned earlier, a significant 
advantage of the DMI model is that transportation resources, including vehicles and 
drivers, are pre-designated and credentialed.130 Furthermore, assets are stored at a single 
location, eliminating the need for multiple pick-ups. Factors, such as traffic congestion, 
although unpredictable, should always be considered. 
2. Cost 
In general, prepositioning MCMs closer to intended users increases costs, as it 
requires management of a larger number of stockpiles to provide equivalent coverage.131 
Inventory models, such as UMI and DMI, however, reduce costs through the elimination 
of the need for local jurisdictions to construct secure and climate controlled storage 
facilities.  
a. Factors Influencing UMI Cost 
Beyond the initial medication purchase, the costs associated with a UMI model 
involve the storage of additional drugs at medical facilities, and the administrative 
management of MCM rotation.132 In this model, the cost of storage is shared among 
multiple facilities. These facilities rotate the stockpiled assets in an effort to forgo the 
periodic disposal and repurchase of expired medications, thereby reducing the costs 
128 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory: An Approach to Forward-Deployment of Urgently 
Needed Medical Countermeasures for Mass-Casualty and Terrorism Incidents, 408–414. 
129 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 17–
21. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 16. 
132 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory: An Approach to Forward-Deployment of Urgently 
Needed Medical Countermeasures for Mass-Casualty and Terrorism Incidents, 408–414. 
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associated with local stockpiling.133 Countering these cost savings however, are the 
extensive transportation resources (vehicles and manpower) necessary for the delivery of 
UMI assets to numerous storage facilities.134  
b. Factors Influencing DMI Cost 
Considering the decreased use of antibiotics in everyday medical use, the wide 
distribution networks of the regional pharmaceutical warehouses may afford more 
efficient rotation operations. While many business executives have come to realize that 
their engagement in disaster response is essential to community resilience, some 
distributors may still assess fees for inventory management services.135 
3. Logistics 
For UMI and DMI models to be viable options for the provision of PEP, the shelf 
life of MCMs must be long enough to allow the amount of material in the supply bubble 
to be consumed by the daily medical use of a healthcare system. The recent emergence of 
drug-resistant bacteria from the suspected over-use of antibiotics has resulted in a 
significant decline in the number of antibiotics prescribed in the day-to-day healthcare 
setting.136 Consequently, the typical market demand for medications, such as 
ciprofloxacin and doxycycline, has diminished to a volume that has made it impractical 
for many healthcare entities, and even some distributors, to enter into medication rotation 
agreements.137  
133 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 17–
21. 
134 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 171. 
135 Mrvos et al., “Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation for Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” 17–
21. 
136 Qiucen Zhang and Robert Austin, “The Goldilocks Principle and Rapid Evolution of Antibiotic 
Resistance in Bacteria,” APS March Meeting 2011, Dallas, TX, March 21–25, 2011, Bulletin of the 
American Physical Society, 56, no. 1 (2011). 
137 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory: An Approach to Forward-Deployment of Urgently 
Needed Medical Countermeasures for Mass-Casualty and Terrorism Incidents, 408–414. 
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a. UMI Logistical Considerations 
The UMI model will require a moderate to high level of logistical planning due to 
the increased number of storage sites. If MCMs are to be retrieved from multiple local 
storage facilities and delivered to PODs, robust communications plans are essential to 
ensure that PEP supplies are distributed appropriately. The use of transportation and 
security resources from multiple organizations, to deliver supplies to multiple PODs, will 
require a clearly defined chain of command, and a pre-determined and reliable 
communications infrastructure.  
Some have discouraged the use of hospital pharmacies for PEP storage and 
distribution. Hospital pharmaceutical storage space is a precious resource, and is 
frequently restricted by the ever-increasing demand for patient care space.138 
Furthermore, it is anticipated that maintaining accurate real-time inventories from 
multiple facilities may prove difficult.139  
Furthermore, it is expected that during a public health emergency, the demands on 
local hospitals will already be extensive, and that the emergency need for medications 
from within the facility will overwhelm hospital pharmacies.140  
An advantage of the widespread storage of MCMs in the UMI model is the 
reduction of the risk of mass MCM destruction at a single storage facility. Another 
ancillary benefit of UMI is that the on-site supply bubble can help buffer against 
temporary medication shortages due to unusual fluctuations in routine demand. 
b. DMI Logistical Considerations 
In the DMI model, all assets are typically stored in a single distribution 
warehouse. Although a centralized storage location increases the risk of mass MCM 
inventory destruction, the DMI model requires fewer resources for activation and 
138 James Little and Brian Coughlan, “Optimal Inventory Policy within Hospital Space Constraints,” 
Health Care Management Science 11, no. 2 (2008), 177–183. 




                                                 
delivery to PODs.141 As discussed previously, this model takes advantage of the full-time 
availability of trained and pre-credentialed delivery personnel.142  
The number of personnel that are appropriately trained and available to perform 
unit-of-dose repackaging must also be considered. The traditional role of a 
pharmaceutical distributor is to provide medications to end-users in standard bulk 
packaging. Additional personnel and packaging resources may be necessary to rapidly 
prepare mass quantities of MCM for distribution.143 
4. Stakeholder Acceptance 
By nature, both UMI and DMI models require partnership agreements. As with 
other models, first responders, healthcare workers, and state and local planners all have 
vested interests in ensuring the availability of PEP. Due to the decentralized nature of the 
model however, the number of stakeholders in a functional UMI system is typically far 
greater than is DMI. 
a. UMI Stakeholder Acceptance 
The employment of a UMI model for the provision of PEP requires the 
engagement and careful collaboration among health care system and emergency services 
partners. This model requires comprehensive partnership agreements between state or 
local planners, and the hospitals, specialty care networks, or pharmacies that are 
providing the storage and rotation of MCM assets.144 These partnerships require 
participants to acknowledge and address multiple challenges, including differences in 
organizational cultures. Operational constraints, such as concerns about liability, the 
confidentiality of healthcare information, and the limits of volunteerism must also be 
overcome.  
141 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory, 408–414. 
142 Mrvos et al., Regional Pharmaceutical Preparation, 17–21. 
143 Havlak, Gorman and Adams, “Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile to 
Respond to a Terrorist Event,” 529–533. 
144 Coleman et al., User-Managed Inventory, 408–414. 
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b. DMI Stakeholder Acceptance 
Beyond the shared values of public health and community service, many private 
entities view their involvement in local disaster planning as an extension of business 
continuity planning.145 Business owners are keenly aware that the survival of businesses 
following a disaster is dependent upon the survival of the community. For emergency 
services and healthcare stakeholders, the advantages to partnering with private industry 
are clear. Public health and government officials are acutely aware of their organizational 
limitations, and welcome the logistical expertise, potential for volunteers, and operational 
infrastructure.146 While partnerships with community business organizations can prove 
mutually beneficial, these relationships require substantial time commitments to 
maintain. Activation plans should be routinely exercised to maintain solid working 
relationships and overcome challenges to collaboration.147 
5. Comprehensiveness 
Multiple factors affect the comprehensiveness of a user or distributor managed 
inventory model for the provision of PEP. Regardless of model, the total quantity of PEP 
on hand must be adequate to provide coverage until the arrival of outside assets, such as 
the SNS. In calculating the quantities of antibiotics needed for PODs, many use a 
simplistic calculation that factors the population, the target time for complete delivery of 
PEP, the hourly throughput of PODs, and the number of PODs available to provide 
PEP.148 Unfortunately, the assumptions that accompany this calculation rarely hold true. 
For instance, the exact number of a population is not known, and an equal number of 
people do not report to each POD. Similarly, throughput rates among PODs have been 
145 Buehler, Whitney, and Berkelman, “Business and Public Health Collaboration for Emergency 
Preparedness in Georgia: A Case Study,” 1–13. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Young M. Lee, “Analyzing Dispensing Plan for Emergency Medical Supplies in the Event of 
Bioterrorism,” Proceedings of the 2008 Winter Simulation Conference, Global Gateway to Discovery, 
WSC 2008, InterContinental Hotel, Miami, FL, December 7–10, 2008 in Winter Simulation Conference, 
2008. 
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found to vary widely from 162 to 1,700 people per hours per site.149 These variations are 
based on influences, such as the number of available staff, the demographics of those 
receiving PEP, and the availability of supplies, which are dependent upon transportation 
resources.150  
Although user and distributor managed inventory models differ in the 
centralization of medication storage, no notable differences exist in the 
comprehensiveness of the two models. 
149 Zaric et al., Modeling the Logistics of Response, 332–350. 
150 Lee, Analyzing Dispensing Plans for Emergency Medical Supplies, 2600–2608. 
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VI. POLICY OPTION 3—PRE-EVENT DISTRIBUTION TO FIRST 
RESPONDERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The advanced placement of medications in the individual households of first 
responders is a suggested strategy for the distribution of antibiotics in the event of an 
anthrax attack. These pre-distributed medications would allow exposed or potentially 
exposed first responders to begin immediate treatment at the direction of public health 
authorities.151  
B. PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
In 2006, the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services partnered with 
the CDC to conduct a MedKit evaluation study. The MedKit prototype, designed by the 
CDC in collaboration with the FDA, consisted of a five-day supply of medication, 
packaged in a four-fold cardboard blister pack. The blister pack was then packaged inside 
of a sealed transparent bag, with instructions for use contained in an outside open 
pouch.152 The prototype was evaluated as an investigational new drug and the study was 
approved to meet all federal and state regulatory requirements. The predominant goals of 
the study were to evaluate a strategy to distribute antibiotics to the general public in a 
timely manner in the event of an anthrax attack, and to assess the ability of households to 
adequately maintain MedKits in the home.153 Social factors, such as attitude and 
perception, which might influence participant behavior were also examined, in an effort 
to gather data regarding the acceptability of the concept. The study listed five proposed 
modalities to bolster the nation’s response capacity, naming the Medkit model as one that 
could be used either alone, or in combination with other strategies, based upon a 
community’s need. At the conclusion of the study, 97% of the MedKits were returned in 
151 Michelle L. Houck and Jeffrey W. Herrmann, “Preparing for an Anthrax Attack: The Impact of 
Distributing MedKits,” Proceedings of the 2011 Industrial Engineering Research Conference, T. Doolen 
and E. Van Aken, ed., Reno, Nevada, May 21–25, 2011. 
152 “CDC’s Division of Strategic National Stockpile Emergency MedKit Evaluation Study Summary.” 
153 Ibid.  
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accordance with the instructions provided, and of those, 99% were intact. The remaining 
3% were either lost, or participants simply refused to return them. During follow-up 
interviews, study participants reported that having the MedKits in their homes increased 
their awareness of the need to prepare for a bioterror attack, with 94% stating that they 
would like to have a MedKit in their home based on the study experience.154  
In 2009, President Barrack Obama issued an executive order: Establishing 
Federal Capability for the Timely Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a 
Biological Attack.155 The order states: “The Federal Government must establish 
mechanisms for the provision of medical countermeasures to personnel performing 
mission-essential functions to ensure that mission-essential functions of Federal agencies 
continue to be performed following a biological attack.”156 Consequently, the FDA 
authorized an EUA for the mass dispensing of doxycycline as PEP for inhalational 
anthrax. 
In a 2012 joint meeting of the Anti-Infective Drugs and the Non-Prescription 
Drugs Advisory Committees, Dr. George Korch Jr., Senior Science Advisor from ASPR, 
sought guidance on the feasibility of the development pathway for MedKits for the first 
responder community. Dr. Korch affirmed ASPR’s desire to provide protection to first 
responders and their household members as soon as possible after an incident, “so the 
first responders have peace of mind to be available to assist the rest of the 
community.”157 The contents of the MedKits, as presented during this meeting were as 
follows: 
• Ten-day course (20 tablets) of doxycycline hyclate per household member 
• Directions for crushing and dosing for children and individuals who 
cannot swallow tablets 
• 10mL syringe 
• Directions for safe disposal of unused, expired kits 
154 “CDC’s Division of Strategic National Stockpile Emergency MedKit Evaluation Study Summary.” 
155 Ibid. 
156 Exec. Order No. 13527 of December 30, 2009, Establishing Federal Capability for the Timely 
Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack, 3 C.F. R. (2010).  
157 Korch Jr., “Doxycycline MedKits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack,” 2.  
 50 
                                                 
• Warning that the kit should only be used as directed by public health 
officials during an anthrax emergency. 
The proposed concept of operations required that MedKits would only be available from 
a licensed physician and dispensed through a pharmacy, with the remaining 50-day 
supply of medications to be obtained from PODs.158 To date, concerns about safety and 
the inappropriate use of pre-dispensed antibiotics have slowed the development of this 
program, and participation has not been expanded beyond those in the first responder 
community.159  
On December 2, 2013, senior officials from ASPR and DHS issued a memo 
addressed to “Occupational Health Directors or equivalent professional,” detailing the 
nature of the program.160 The letter encouraged those who are licensed to prescribe 
medications in their state of practice to consider, in the spirit of preparedness, providing a 
10-day antibacterial drug supply for first responders to keep in their homes. The letter 
listed three oral antibacterial drugs (ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and levofloxacin) that are 
indicated and FDA approved for PEP, and emphasized the criticality of providing 
appropriate storage and usage instructions. It is important to note that as approved, this 
program differs from the MedKit program in that it does not recommend issuing 
medications to family members of first responders, stating that they will received their 
PEP with the general public.161 
158 “Doxycycline Medkits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack,” U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority, Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Committee of the Federal Drug 
Administration, April 2, 2012, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting 
Materials/Drugs/Anti-InfectiveDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM297762.pdf. 
159 Houck and Herrmann, “Preparing for an Anthrax Attack: The Impact of Distributing MedKits.”  
160 Nicole Lurie and Kathryn Brinsfield, “Letter to Occupational Health Directors or Equivalent 





                                                 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of Response 
Upon receiving direction from public health authorities, first responders with 
current pre-distributed antibiotics would have immediate access to PEP. Medications 
could be kept at home, at work, or on a person for rapid access, and would eliminate the 
need for first responders to seek access to PEP from other sources. A study conducted in 
2011 using a compartmental model to predict the deaths from an anthrax attack 
consistently found that the number of deaths decreased as more pre-dispensed antibiotics 
(MedKits) were distributed.162 This finding is illustrated in Figure 4, which is based upon 
a scenario in which the rate of prophylaxis adherence is 90%, and the SNS push-pack 
delay is 24 hours.163 
 
Figure 4.  The mortality rate decreases when more MedKits are distributed 
before an attack. N = number exposed. b = percentage of non-exposed 
persons seeking prophylaxis (potential exposures). 
Although this program is only available for first responders, the elimination of 
these individuals from those to which PEP must be distributed post-attack would reduce 
the burden on PODs. Based on workforce estimates, making antibiotics available to the first 
162 Lurie and Brinsfield, “Letter to Occupational Health Directors or Equivalent Professional.” 
163 Houck and Herrmann, Predicting the Impact of Placing Pre-Event Pharmaceuticals, 17. 
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responder community could result in a nationwide reduction of approximately of 3.2 million 
people from POD throughput.164 Furthermore, the availability of first responders to assist 
in the distribution of PEP to the general public can increase POD throughput, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of providing PEP to an entire population within the 
recommended 48-hour window.165 
2. Cost 
There is no comparable program history from which to gauge the cost of pre-
dispensing antibiotics to first responders. As stated in the 2013 DHS memo to healthcare 
practitioners however, it is anticipated that any costs associated with this model will be 
deferred to the individual first responder.166 This would include the cost of a pre-
screening doctor’s visit, as well as the cost of the actual prescription, which would vary 
significantly dependent upon individual prescription medication coverage. This 
transference of cost may be the result of a 2011 report commissioned by the IOM, 
estimating MedKits to be 215% more costly than the use of the SNS for PEP, and 127% 
more than the U.S. Postal Service delivery model.167 It should be noted that an extreme 
case was used for illustrative purposes, assuming no use of PODs for distributing the 
initial 10-day prophylactic course of antibiotics. The high cost of this model can be 
attributed to the costs associated with packaging ($5.12/person/10-day supply), and 
delivery ($5.45 million) of medications.168 Although the currently approved pre-
dispensing model has eliminated the prohibitive costs associated with packaging and 
shipping, the less expensive telephone pre-screening method used for home MedKits has 
been replaced by the added financial burden of a physician office visit.169  
164 “Doxycycline Medkits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack.” 
165 Charles DiMaggio et al., “The Willingness of U.S. Emergency Medical Technicians to Respond to 
Terrorist Incidents,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 3, no. 4 
(2005): 331–337.  
166 Lurie and Brinsfield, “Letter to Occupational Health Directors or Equivalent Professional.” 
167 Clare Stroud et al., “Commissioned Paper: A Cost and Speed Analysis of Strategies,” National 
Center for Biotechnology Information, 2011, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK190050/?report= 
printable. 
168 Ibid. 
169 “Doxycycline Medkits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack.” 
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This model carries the highest sustainment cost as well, as current FDA EUA 
regulations would require the annual replacement of medications.170 This cost includes 
not only medication replacement, but also the annual medical screening required for re-
issue. Although the option exists for first responder organizations to absorb the cost of 
this program, consistently diminishing federal HLS grant dollars would challenge the 
ability to sustain this alternative source of funding. 
3. Logistics 
Pre-dispensing antibiotics to first responders may relieve some logistical burdens, 
however other models of distribution must still be available for the general public. This 
model requires that individuals classified as first responders obtain a prescription directly 
from their occupational health or personal physicians, and in turn obtain the medications 
from a pharmacy. While it is not expected that removing this population from the POD 
distribution model will significantly diminish the logistical requirements of any one POD, 
the requirement for storage space would be eliminated if this model were employed as an 
alternative to local stockpiling for first responders.171  
Administratively, first responder organizations attempting to track employee 
participation in this voluntary program would need to develop a means to differentiate 
those who have obtained the medications from those who have not. This data would be 
necessary to estimate accurately those who would still need PEP from an alternate source 
in the event of an incident. Without accurate documentation, the anticipated number of 
first responders left to rely on PODs may be grossly over-estimated, resulting in the need 
to redistribute medications among public PODs.  
4. Stakeholder Acceptance 
First responders are critical stakeholders in the issue of PEP, as they are expected 
to respond to calls for assistance during an emergency. Immediate access to PEP would 
provide incentive for responders to report to duty, and would reduce the burden on those 
170 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 257–259.  
171 Stroud et al., “Commissioned Paper: A Cost and Speed Analysis of Strategies.” 
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tasked with post-incident dispensing to the first responder community.172 Unlike the 
proposed MedKit model however, this program does not offer pre-event distribution to 
the family members of first responders. Studies examining the ability and willingness of 
responders to report in a variety of disaster situations revealed a willingness to respond as 
low as 50% for biological events.173 However, when PEP is made available for first 
responders and their families in advance of an emergency event, these same studies 
revealed an increased responder willingness to report for duty. The Emergency Services 
Coalition for Medical Preparedness, comprised of national associations representing 
emergency services organizations and personnel, further supports these findings.174 The 
Coalition represents millions of career and volunteer personnel in the law enforcement, 
fire and emergency services, EMS, emergency management, and public works 
disciplines.175 Citing the statistics in the above study, the Coalition and its member 
organizations advocated for increasing national resilience via the provision of MedKits 
for emergency services personnel and their families.176 Based on this information, first 
responders may be less apt to report for duty if their families are not provided with 
adequate PEP. 
Federal stakeholders, such as DHS, ASPR, CDC and the FDA, have all endorsed 
this model, although it is not mandated. Likewise, the determination of which populations 
are considered first responders is left to the discretion of individual jurisdictions.177 
Based upon the already existing variability of policies and standard operating procedures 
among jurisdictions, it is reasonable to expect that leaving this determination up to state 
and local officials will result in inconsistent and inequitable policies.  
172 Michael Chervenic, “Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) Biological Attack 
Response and Recovery: End to End Medical Countermeasure Distribution and Dispensing Processes,” 
National Technical Information Services (April 2012): 1–118. 
173 DiMaggio et al., The Willingness of U.S. Emergency Medical Technicians to Respond to Terrorist 
Incidents, 331–337.  
174 “About the Coalition,” Emergency Services Coalition for Medical Preparedness, June 13, 2014, 
http://www.emergencyservicescoalition.org/aboutus.htm. 
175 Ibid.  
176 “Doxycycline Medkits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack.” 
177 Ibid. 
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Psychosocial factors should also be considered when assessing this model. 
Because this model involves the individual distribution of medications, the responsibility 
lies with the first responder to obtain the requisite medical screening and prescription 
necessary for the medications to be issued.178 Likewise, the annual renewal process also 
requires the initiative of the individual first responder. Although the instances of anthrax 
exposure in the United States are few, studies on the willingness to accept prophylaxis 
after the 2001 anthrax attacks revealed an overall adherence rate of only 44% among 
postal workers who were provided the recommended 60-day post-exposure course of 
medication.179 This finding suggests that a large portion of those with potential for 
exposure may not value the availability of PEP, and would therefore be less likely to 
maintain personal supplies. Conversely, inconsistent policies between neighboring 
jurisdictions resulting in the employer absorbed costs of PEP in one organization and not 
in another, invites the notion that some first responders may be unwilling to respond if 
they are not provided the same coverage as their peers.  
Lastly, this model requires the willingness of physicians to prescribe medications 
prior to the occurrence of an incident. There has been considerable concern of late 
regarding antimicrobial resistance due to the frequent misuse of antibiotics.180 These and 
concerns over the inappropriate use for other illnesses have prevailed over the findings of 
the MedKit study, which demonstrated a 97% return rate.181 Healthcare practitioners may 
elect not to prescribe PEP medications if their perceived risk of antimicrobial resistance 
is greater than their perceived risk of an anthrax attack. 
178 “Frequently Asked Questions: For the HHS/DHS Letter to Occupational Health Directors 
regarding Doxycycline Prescriptions for First Responders,” U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, last reviewed March 18, 2014, http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/Pages/faq-
responder-doxycycline.aspx.  
179 Colin W. Shepard et al., “Antimicrobial Postexposure Prophylaxis for Anthrax: Adverse Events 
and Adherence,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (2002): 1124–1132.  
180 Zhang and Austin, The Goldilocks Principle and Rapid Evolution of Antibiotic Resistance in 
Bacteria.  
181 Korch Jr., “Doxycycline MedKits for Public Health Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack,” 22. 
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5. Comprehensiveness 
The pre-dispensing model provides PEP coverage to those first responders that 
have elected to participate in the program, but requires that the remainder of the 
population, including the families of first responders, obtain PEP elsewhere. While some 
may view this model as giving priority to first responders, it is important to recognize that 
rapid PEP access for these individuals may result in more timely distribution to others. 
Although cost prohibitive, the pre-event distribution to an entire population would 
provide the most equitable distribution of all proposed models.182 Nevertheless, this 
would still exclude those that are unable to afford the cost of the medications, or those 
without a physician willing to prescribe the kit. 
Because medications are not to be taken unless directed by public health officials, 
methods of communication must also be comprehensive and well thought out when 
considering this model.183 Delivering this information to all citizens equitably requires 
ensuring that messaging is transmitted in multiple languages and via multiple mediums. 
The enlistment of civic organizations, the anticipation of the needs of special-needs 
populations, and the delivery of messages that reflect the values and priorities of affected 
populations are all valuable communication tactics to enhance the equitable 
dissemination of information.184 
182 Stroud et al., “Commissioned Paper: A Cost and Speed Analysis of Strategies.” 
183 Houck and Herrmann, Predicting the Impact of Placing Pre-Event Pharmaceuticals, 2.  
184 Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a 
City Against Panic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases: An Official Publication of the Infectious Diseases 
Society of America 34, no. 2 (January 15, 2002): 217–223.  
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VII. POLICY OPTION 4—SOLE RELIANCE ON THE SNS FOR 
PEP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, 
life-support medications, IV administration, airway maintenance supplies, and 
medical/surgical items and is managed by the CDC. Although exact quantities are not 
published, the SNS contains enough medications to provide coverage to 10 million 
exposed individuals in several large cities in the event of multiple simultaneous 
attacks.185 Designed to supplement and re-supply state and local public health agencies in 
the event of a national emergency, the SNS can be delivered anywhere and at any time 
within the U.S. or its territories within 12-hours of the federal decision to deploy. This 
rapid delivery process is assured through the strategic placement of twelve Push 
Packages, located in undisclosed locations around the United States.186 The Push 
Package model was built primarily for the purposes of chemical and biological terrorism 
response.187 Each of these 50-ton packages consists of approximately 100 specialized 
cargo containers, and includes antimicrobial medications and chemical antidotes, as well 
as various other medical supplies. Once the exact nature of an incident is known, 
additional supplies are available from the SNS via the VMI portion of the program, 
which can be specifically tailored to the emergency needs of an incident.188 On 
September 11, 2001, the State of New York requested a 12-hour Push Pack. Despite the 
suspension of all air and ground transportation in an around New York City, the Push 
Pack arrived, with a police escort, within seven hours of the official request.189 
185 Maged M. Dessouky and Fernando Ordonez, Supply Chain Management of the Strategic National 
Stockpiles (Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Research Project Summaries, 2009).  
186 Raphael M. Barishansky, “The Strategic National Stockpile (and What It Can Do for You),” EMS 
World, February 24, 2010, http://www.emsworld.com/article/10319802/the-strategic-national-stockpile.  
187 Havlak, Gorman, and Adams, “Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile to 




                                                 
B. PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
The HHS and the CDC established the NPS in 1999. This action was ordered by 
the United States Congress, with the intent of establishing the capability to re-supply 
large quantities of essential medical materiel to states and communities, within 12 hours 
of the federal decision to deploy.190 Effective March 2003, the NPS became the SNS, 
managed jointly by DHS and HHS. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 tasked the DHS 
with defining the goals and performance requirements of the SNS Program, as well as 
with managing the actual deployment of assets. This task, formally assigned to HHS in 
2003, has been subsequently delegated to ASPR, who leads the Public Health Emergency 
Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE). The PHEMCE includes three primary 
HHS internal agency partners: the CDC, the FDA, and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), as well as several interagency partners: the DOD, the VA, the DHS, and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).191 The Enterprise works with governmental and 
non-governmental partners to upgrade the nation’s public health capacity to respond to a 
national emergency. HHS lists “develop logistics and operational plans for optimized use 
of medical countermeasures at all levels of response” as one of their primary goals in 
their December 2012 PHEMCE Implementation Plan.192 To achieve this goal, the 
document proposes the promotion of innovative approaches to inventory management, to 
enable a sustainable preparedness infrastructure through the optimization of the SNS 
formulary and the cost-effective management of all SNS assets. 
Critical to the success of this initiative is ensuring that capacity is developed at 
federal, state, and local levels to receive, stage, and dispense SNS assets.193 Once SNS 
assets are received in a requesting jurisdiction’s RSS site, authority for the SNS materials 
is transferred to the state and local authorities. State and local authorities are responsible 
190 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
191 “PHEMCE Governance—PHE,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, last reviewed 
June 20, 2012, http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/governance.aspx. 
192 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2012), 73.  
193 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
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for the breakdown of the Push Packs for distribution. Members of the SNS technical 
assistance team will remain on site to assist and advise state and local officials in putting 
the SNS assets to prompt and effective use. To assist metropolitan regions in preparing to 
receive materials from the SNS, the CRI, established in 2004, focuses on enhancing 
preparedness in the nation’s largest cities and metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), which 
account for more than 50% of the U.S. population.194 Through the CRI program, state 
and local public health officials have developed pre-designated RSS sites and plans to 
respond to bioterrorism events by dispensing antibiotics to the entire population of an 
identified MSA within 48 hours of event detection.195 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of Response 
SNS response objectives were developed after consultation with panels of experts 
on the subjects of biological and chemical terrorism, and based on published treatment 
recommendations for the threat agents deemed to have the highest degree of lethality.196 
The SNS is designed around two tiers of response: the 12-hour Push Package, and 
VMI.197 Through partnership transportation agreements with public, federal and private 
airfreight carriers to ensure timeliness, a SNS Push Package can be deployed anywhere in 
the United States and its territories within 12 hours.198  
While it may take longer to receive VMI (24–36 hours), the smaller size and more 
specialized content require less time to sort and prepare the assets once delivered.199 
During the October 2001 anthrax attacks, the CDC responded with VMI to provide 
antimicrobials for PEP for exposed mail handlers, employees of Congressional office 
194 C. D. Nelson et al., “Federal Initiative Increases Community Preparedness for Public Health 
Emergencies,” Health Affairs (Project Hope) 29, no. 12 (December 2010): 2286–2293.  
195 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
196 Havlak, Gorman, and Adams, Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile, 
529–533.  
197 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
198 Steven D. Bice, The U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program (Atlanta, GA: Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2001), 451.  
199 “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).” 
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buildings and personnel from affected media organizations. During fall 2001, the SNS 
filled at least 80 VMI requests across the United States, with an average delivery time of 
five hours from the receipt of the request.200 A state or jurisdiction’s capacity to receive, 
sort and redistribute these assets must be considered when calculating the time until PEP 
is available for dispensing.  
Although specific practices regarding POD operations are beyond the scope of 
this research, it is important to note that achieving maximum POD throughput is essential 
to the viability of this model.201 A 2012 RAND study evaluating the effectiveness of the 
CRI reported that although jurisdictions conducted and reported data on 2,768 drills from 
2008–2010, few had tested their capabilities at a large scale. For example, many 
jurisdictions have tested staff call-down procedures, but nearly 90% of these tests 
involved 100 or fewer people, thus limiting efforts to estimate the capability to contact all 
essential staff during a large-scale event.202 Similarly, in 2009 and 2010, only 32% of 
drills that tested dispensing at PODs involved 500 clients or more. POD drills with higher 
numbers of clients reported higher throughputs, suggesting that greater countermeasure 
dispensing capability might be revealed in more high-stress PODs.203 
2. Cost 
Significant costs are associated with the disposal and repurchase of expired 
medications in quantities as sizeable as those held by the SNS.204 Unlike state and local 
stockpiles, the SNS is afforded the benefit of inclusion in the SLEP. This fee-for-service 
program is intended for certain large federal stockpiles of military significance or 
contingency use products, and is administered by the DOD.205 The DOD and SNS both 
200 Havlak, Gorman, and Adams, Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile, 
529–533.  
201 Onora Lien et al., “Getting Medicine to Millions: New Strategies for Mass Distribution,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, no. 2 (2006): 176–182. 
202 Nelson et al., Analysis of the Cities Readiness Initiative (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2012), 13, http://lbr.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1200.pdf. 
203 Ibid.  
204 Stroud et al., ed., Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax, 133–136.  
205 Bodas et al., “Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) As a Significant Contributor to Strategic 
National Stockpile Maintenance: The Israeli Experience with Ciprofloxacin,” 182–187.  
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maintain large stockpiles of medications and vaccines to ensure that both military and 
civilian populations have access to antidotes and treatments in the event of a medical 
emergency. The FDA and DOD developed this system to save federal dollars by 
extending the shelf life of pharmaceuticals beyond the manufacturer’s expiration date. All 
testing for extensions is done at FDA test facilities.206  
While the cost-savings advantage afforded by the SLEP program is significant, 
another factor to consider when evaluating cost effectiveness is the purchasing power 
afforded to the SNS through a partnership agreement with the VA’s National Acquisition 
Center (NAC). This innovative purchasing agreement allows the CDC to take advantage 
of the VA’s existing contract pricing arrangements with pharmaceutical vendors, which 
provides for a purchase price far lower than those extended to other buyers.207 While the 
NAC is provided a fee for their procurement services, the savings attributed to this 
agreement more than offset the cost of doing business.208 
The federal government passed new legislation and approved vast increases in 
federal biodefense programs as a result of post-9/11 biological weapons concerns.209 
Beginning in 2005, however, federal preparedness dollars have steadily decreased.210 
More recent trends in funding have demonstrated a reorganization of funds that has 
resulted in a decrease in the SNS budget. For example, the FY2013 HHS budget for 
civilian biodefense was $3.96 billion.211 Although this number appears to be a 1% 
increase over FY2012 funding, the reality is that several biodefense programs have been 
combined with other line items, such as chemical and all-hazards preparedness programs. 
The end result is actually a $54 million decrease in the Public Health Emergency 
206 “Implementation Plan for the National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 2012, http://www. phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/ 
authority/nhss/ip/Documents/nhss-ip.pdf.  
207 Bice, The U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program, 52.  
208 Ibid.  
209 Kathleen Vogel, “Bioweapons Proliferation Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide,” 
Social Studies of Science 36, no. 5 (2006): 659–690.  
210 Gursky and Bice, Assessing a Decade of Public Health Preparedness, 55–65.  
211 Crystal Franco and Tara Kirk Sell, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2012–FY2013,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 2 (2012): 162–181.  
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Preparedness (PHEP) and SNS programs.212 The future of bioterrorism funding is 
uncertain, and many predict that funding streams will continue to diminish. In moving 
forward, the HHS will need to be innovative in maintaining the current SNS response 
capabilities, with a diminishing budget. An increase in state and local dependency on the 
SNS requiring larger inventories and more robust transportation capabilities only 
proliferates these challenges. A projected increase in needs for sustainment is not 
compatible with consistently decreasing funding levels. 
3. Logistics 
The logistical requirements for this model include manpower, physical space and 
transportation resources from federal, state, and local governments, as well as private 
industry. The CDC consulted extensively with major worldwide transportation carriers 
and the DOD in selecting push-pack storage sites. Consideration was given to factors, 
such as air traffic hub locations, traffic volume, air courier staff availability, regional 
weather characteristics and the proximity of DOD assets.213 Although the exact locations 
are undisclosed for security reasons, the 12 storage sites were carefully chosen to ensure 
timeliness in response to any location within the United States and its territories.214  
The CDC requires that state and local public health agencies be prepared to 
receive, manage, and dispense the SNS under a cooperative agreement that provides 
funding to states and select cities for public health emergency preparedness.215 Once 
assets are delivered to a requesting state’s RSS site, PEP distribution is the responsibility 
of the receiving jurisdiction. The SNS 12-hour Push Pack consists of 50 tons of 
pharmaceuticals and medical material that will arrive in 12 hours or less by air or ground 
transport. The push pack fills a wide-body aircraft, occupies 130 cargo containers, and 
requires 12,000 cubic feet of ground/floor space for proper receiving, staging and 
212 Franco and Sell, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2012–FY2013,” 162–181. 
213 Bice, The U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program, 26–27. 
214 Havlak, Gorman and Adams, Challenges Associated with Creating a Pharmaceutical Stockpile, 
529–533.  
215 Lien et al., “Getting Medicine to Millions,” 176–182. 
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sorting.216 Upon receipt, the assets must be unpacked, sorted and distributed. Through the 
CRI, all states and Washington, DC, have established plans to receive and distribute 
supplies from the SNS.217 State and local public health agencies are charged with overall 
RSS site management and provide the personnel necessary to sort incoming assets. 
Due to the massive quantities maintained by the SNS, unit-dose packaging of all 
medications is cost prohibitive and limits stock rotation capabilities.218 Although each 
12-hour push package does contain a limited quantity of individually wrapped tablets 
(blister packs), the majority of the SNS is supplied in bulk packaging. Appropriately 
trained personnel must be available to repackage medications for individual dosing upon 
receipt. 
4. Stakeholder Acceptance 
The identity and motivations of stakeholders must be analyzed when determining 
the feasibility of using the SNS for nationwide PEP. While bioterrorism preparedness 
may be deemed a top priority by politicians and lawmakers in Washington, DC, this may 
not be the case for those in less populated regions that are considered to have a lessor 
likelihood of attack. To complicate matters further, the role of federal, versus state and 
local authorities after a biological attack has yet to be clarified.219 Despite the fact that 
many states currently rely upon the SNS as their primary source of PEP in the event of an 
anthrax attack, the CDC continues to maintain that the SNS is not intended as a primary 
response mechanism.220 Formal acceptance of the charge to provide first-line coverage 
will require expansion of the current SNS capabilities to facilitate larger inventories, and 
more robust rotation and deployment capabilities. Furthermore, to provide clarity of 
216 Bice, The U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program. 
217 Jeffrey Levi et al., Ready Or Not?: Protecting the Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and 
Bioterrorism (Washington, DC: Trust for America’s Health, 2012).  
218 Bice, The U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program. 
219 Richard Danzig, “A Decade of Countering Bioterrorism: Incremental Progress, Fundamental 
Failings,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 1 (2012), 49–
54.  
220 Amesh A. Adalja et al., “The Globalization of U.S. Medical Countermeasure Production and its 
Implications for National Security,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and 
Science 10, no. 3 (2012): 255–257.  
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command authority, assigning the provision of PEP as a primary responsibility of the 
federal government would require a reconfiguration of power relationships among major 
bureaucracies. The United States Congress is organized into a series of committees and 
subcommittees, often with overlapping jurisdictions, through which legislation must pass 
before it comes to the House and Senate for vote. This structure results in an institutional 
bias in U.S. politics favoring the status quo, and makes reform a process that must clear 
multiple legislative hurdles.221 Assuring that federal government leaders and elected 
officials do not sacrifice the progress made since 2001 to new priorities and shifting 
political interests is paramount. In the 2012 report Anticipated Responsibilities of the 
Strategic National Stockpile in the Year 2020: An Examination with Recommendations, 
the National Biodefense Science Board and the Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response Board of Scientific Counselors urge the continued use of emerging 
computational modeling and simulation technologies to improve the decision-making 
capabilities of the DSNS.222 The report goes on to suggest that scientific and consistent 
cost-benefit analysis can reduce the logistical burdens associated with the program 
through the more efficient management of SNS inventories.  
In the United States, the existing bioterrorism response framework is built on the 
principle of local response and control.223 The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States 
forced the insertion of public health into the emergency management/emergency response 
arena.224 Cooperative planning and response among local law enforcement, fire and 
emergency management officials led to a mutual understanding of roles, responsibilities 
and capabilities. Although PEP for first responders would likely be dispensed through 
closed (intended only for first responders) PODs or workplace distribution mechanisms, 
221 Jonathan Oberlander, “The Politics of Health Reform: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good 
Plans?” Health Affairs (2003): W3–391.  
222 National Biodefense Science Board and the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response 
Board of Scientific Counselors, Anticipated Responsibilities of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in the 
Year 2020: An Examination with Recommendations.  
223 Justin W. Timbie et al., “Allocation of Scarce Resources during Mass Casualty Events,” Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (US) Evidence Reports/Technology Assessments, no. 207 (June 
2012): 1–6, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK98854/. 
224 David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, Are We Ready? Public Health since 9/11 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2006), 211.  
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the sole use of this model would force first responders to delay PEP until supplies are 
received from the SNS.  
5. Comprehensiveness 
Researchers have used several criteria to determine the priority of distribution of 
resources: the individual’s role in society (occupation), equity, survivability (the number 
of anticipated years of survival if treated), vulnerability, risk of exposure and the 
likelihood of recovery.225 Of these criteria, the concerns regarding equity play the most 
significant role in the public health arena as all participants, in all studies, unanimously 
agreed that decisions based on race, gender, culture, legal status, nationality, language, or 
income were unacceptable.226  
The strategic placement of SNS push-packs ensures delivery to any U.S. state or 
territory within 12 hours of the federal decision to deploy. For the sake of security, the 
exact locations of the storage sites are undisclosed, however based on the probability of 
attack in a major metropolitan area, it would seem reasonable to assume that the 
anticipated delivery time to more high-risk regions, such as Washington, DC, New York 
City, and Los Angeles, would perhaps be shorter than the less populous regions 
throughout the country. Although the POD distribution model has proven an efficient 
means of timely distribution of medications, it leaves portions of the population that are 
unable to access a POD unprotected. Such at-risk groups might include the elderly, those 
that are mentally or physically disabled, vagrant populations, or those that simply may 
not have transportation to a POD. 
225 Timbie et al., “Allocation of Scarce Resources during Mass Casualty Events.” 
226 Ibid. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If there is a one percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass 
destruction…the United States must now act as if it were a certainty. 
–Ron Suskind in The One Percent Doctrine 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In the 21st century, it is rarely the case that emergency planners are faced with a 
threat of such magnitude, for which they have such limited experience. Despite the 
plethora of scientific data and modeling to support the exceptionally destructive potential 
of an aerosolized B. anthracis attack, the fact remains that there are no universally 
accepted guidelines for the provision of PEP at the regional, state or local levels. 
Consequently, many jurisdictions have experienced failed initiatives in planning to 
provide adequate PEP in the event of an anthrax attack. Furthermore, planning 
inconsistencies among neighboring jurisdictions have resulted in incongruent response 
plans that only exacerbate already chaotic incidents. There is no perfect, one-size-fits-all 
solution, as jurisdictional capabilities and limitations vary significantly across the 
country. When fused with the current literature on preparation and response to an anthrax 
attack, the model analysis presented in this thesis offers guidance to assist planners at the 
state, local, or regional levels in establishing an appropriate anthrax post-exposure 
prophylaxis plan. The careful evaluation of the characteristics of the individual models 
presented here can assist in determining the most efficient means of providing PEP to 
populations of all sizes.  
This research used timeliness, cost, logistics, stakeholder acceptance and 
comprehensiveness as the evaluative criteria for each PEP model. This chapter defines 
these criteria and describes the assigned outcome values for each. The chapter concludes 
with recommendations for the analysis of policy options and a brief discussion of 
opportunities for future research. 
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B. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND OUTCOME VALUES 
Outcome values were applied in the evaluation of research and available data 
based on the following criteria. 
• Timeliness: The evaluation of timeliness is based upon the time from the 
recognition of the need for PEP, until the availability for dispensing.  
• A = PEP is immediately available for dispensing. 
• B = The availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to be <12 hours 
but not likely to be immediately accessible 
• C = The availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to be ≥12 hours 
• Cost: The determination of cost considers the funding required for 
procurement, maintenance, activation and sustainment of a PEP model. 
Variables include fees associated with storage space, administration, 
rotation, delivery and packaging. 
• A = It is likely that full funding for a model can be absorbed in the 
typical operating budget. 
• B = The model requires some supplementation from outside 
funding source(s). 
• C = The model is likely to require majority or full funding from 
outside sources. 
• Logistics: The logistical requirements of a model are measured based on 
requirements for storage space, manpower, transportation resources, and 
administrative coordination. 
• A = It is likely that all logistical resources required for a model are 
readily available in most metropolitan areas. 
• B = Some outside or mutual aide assistance is likely to be required 
to meet the logistical demands of a model. 
• C = The model is likely to exceed the logistical capabilities of 
most metropolitan areas, thus requiring significant logistical 
support from outside resources. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance: The evaluation of stakeholder acceptance is 
based upon the likelihood that primary stakeholder groups will regard a 
model as appropriate for their jurisdiction. Stakeholders can include, but 
are not limited to, first responders, lawmakers and politicians, business 
community executives, and citizens. 
• A = The model is likely to be viewed as favorable by the majority 
of relevant stakeholder groups. 
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• B = It is likely that there will be divided support among relevant 
stakeholder groups.  
• C = It is likely that fewer than half of the relevant stakeholder 
groups are likely to consider the model as favorable. 
• Comprehensiveness: The comprehensiveness of a PEP model is evaluated 
based upon its ability to provide equal access to PEP for as many people 
as necessary, within the recommended 48-hour dispensing window. 
• A = The model is likely to provide sufficient quantities of PEP 
medications that are equally accessible to all population sectors. 
• B = The quantity of PEP medication available for dispensing is 
likely to be sufficient for only select portions of a population. 
• C = The model provides little or no availability to PEP 
medications. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The following provides a brief discussion of the outcome values assigned to each 
of the evaluative criteria, specific to the four PEP models reviewed in this research. The 
results of this analysis are based on the general characteristics of each model as discussed 
throughout this research, and are summarized in an outcomes matrix at the conclusion of 
this section in Table 1. 
1. Local Stockpiles 
• Timeliness (B): Locally stored PEP stockpiles must be activated and 
delivered to dispensing points. The timeliness of this model is therefore 
dependent upon a jurisdiction’s activation approval process and on the 
resources available to deliver the assets. While these processes do not 
offer immediate availability, it is expected that PEP would be available for 
dispensing in less than 12 hours. 
• Cost (B): The costs associated with this model include the initial purchase 
of PEP medications, local storage, manpower for sorting and delivery, and 
the costs associated with the use of transportation resources. It is 
reasonable to suggest that some of these costs, such as those associated 
with storage and/or delivery, may be absorbed by individual stakeholder 
organizations. The initial purchase and replacement costs however often 
exceed the financial resources of a jurisdiction and require grant funding 
to procure. As an example, the Baltimore metropolitan region’s efforts to 
establish and sustain a PEP stockpile required the use of UASI monies to 
fund the initial purchase of medications and packaging supplies. UASI 
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dollars were also used to construct a secure and environmentally 
controlled storage facility that was monitored and maintained by a local 
jurisdiction at the site of their fire headquarters. Upon activation, costs for 
manpower and transportation resources are assumed by the jurisdiction 
requesting assets. To sustain the stockpile, replacement of the medications 
is currently dependent upon the availability of additional grant funding. 
• Logistics (A): It is likely that the combined logistical resources of 
stakeholders within most metropolitan jurisdictions will prove adequate 
for this model. Throughout the course of daily business, area public health, 
fire/EMS, law enforcement, and emergency management organizations 
operate under pre-existing mutual aide or resource sharing agreements. 
Although the demand for personnel, transportation and security resources 
is increased during times of crisis, meticulous pre-planning, and resource 
pooling can typically be employed to overcome logistical barriers. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance (A): The practice of stockpiling medications for 
an entire population has traditionally been deemed as cost prohibitive. 
Consequently, most local PEP stockpiles are established with the intent of 
providing PEP to first responders and their families. These groups may be 
comprised of individuals from law enforcement, fire/EMS, public health, 
emergency management and often public works. These individuals are 
likely to view this model as highly favorable, as they would be among the 
first recipients of PEP, thereby decreasing the likelihood of infection 
during response to an incident. It is anticipated that stakeholder groups, 
such as politicians and government officials, will also favor this model as 
it results in increased local preparedness levels, and a decreased reliance 
on federal government resources from the SNS. 
• Comprehensiveness (B): The local stockpile model, which provides 
limited quantities of medication, is only moderately comprehensive in its 
ability to provide PEP to an entire population. From a societal perspective, 
although this model provides early protection to first responders, it leaves 
the majority of a population dependent upon response from the SNS. 
2. Jurisdictional Cache Acquisition with Third Party Inventory 
Management 
• Timeliness (B): Much like the local stockpiling policy option, this model 
is likely to make PEP available for dispensing in less than 12 hours. The 
potential for multiple storage/rotation sites however suggests that 
availability will not be immediate and will likely be longer than those 
models that offer a single point of storage. 
• Cost (B): The rotation of PEP medications into the daily use market prior 
to expiration reduces replacement costs. This model may still result in 
some expired medications due to the diminished market demand for 
antibiotics. It is anticipated however, that any cost-savings incurred 
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through medication rotation will be offset by fees for rotation and storage 
services.  
• Logistics (C): This model has substantial logistical requirements. Due to 
the potential for multiple storage locations, demand for transportation 
resources will be high if medications are to be delivered in a timely and 
equitable manner. Additionally, constant administrative monitoring is 
required to ensure that accurate inventory levels are maintained for each 
storage location, and that the medications are rotated prior to expiration. 
Jurisdictions electing to employ a DMI model transfer these logistical 
burdens to the distributor. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance (B): Relative to the other models presented in this 
study, this model incorporates more individual stakeholder organizations. 
UMI models typically use healthcare network partners, such as hospital or 
clinics, to provide storage and rotation services. Although these 
organizations acknowledge the importance of public health preparedness, 
they are unlikely to favor this policy option based on the increased 
logistical burdens assumed by each facility. On the other hand, first 
responder organizations are likely to prefer this model as it provides more 
timely access to PEP than does the SNS, and they are relieved of many of 
the model’s logistical responsibilities. 
• Comprehensiveness (B): Jurisdictions that have implemented this model 
are afforded the opportunity to purchase larger quantities of PEP due to 
the cost savings realized through the rotation of medications prior to 
expiration. While more medication provides the potential for distribution 
to a greater portion of the population, the logistical burdens of this model 
make it unlikely that PEP resources will reach PODs equitably.  
3. Pre-Event Distribution to First Responders 
• Timeliness (A): Pre-dispensing PEP provides immediate availability to 
first responders.  
• Cost (C): As previously discussed, this is the most costly model of those 
studied due to the costs associated with packaging and pre-screening 
doctor’s visits. This model also has the potential to be the most costly for 
the individual first responder, as some jurisdictions may not reimburse for 
the cost of pre-screening doctor’s visits or medications. 
• Logistics (A): This model delegates the majority of the logistical 
requirements to the individual first responder. Prior to an incident, first 
responders must obtain a prescription via a pre-screening doctor’s exam, 
and must obtain the medications from a pharmacy. The burden then falls 
to the individual to store the medications in an environmentally controlled 
and easily accessible area in their home or workplace. Furthermore, the 
individual first responder must also ensure that the medications are 
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replaced prior to expiration, which would require a follow-up doctor’s 
visit and subsequent re-purchase of medications. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance (B): It is likely that individual first responders 
will be divided in their support of this model. Many, particularly those that 
are uninsured or without prescription drug coverage, will not assume the 
financial responsibilities associated with the model. Others however, will 
be willing to incur the associated costs to have immediate access and 
personal responsibility for the administration of PEP. From the perspective 
of public safety organizational leadership, transferring the responsibility to 
the individual first responder may relieve the organization of dispensing 
medications through closed PODs. If an organization does not mandate 
participation in the pre-dispensed PEP program however, it is apparent 
that the administrative requirements would be substantial in accurately 
tracking who do and do not have current medications.  
• Comprehensiveness (B): Because this model is only available for use in 
first responder organizations, it does not appear to be a comprehensive 
model for an entire population. Furthermore, the fact that this model does 
not allow for pre-event dispensing to the families of first responders, may 
significantly impact the willingness of first responders to report for duty, 
thus challenging the intent of providing early PEP for first responders. 
4. Sole Reliance on the SNS for PEP 
• Timeliness (C): The mission of the DSNS is to deliver PEP push packages 
to any location in the United States and its territories, within 12 hours of 
the approval to deploy. In reality, the response time for these assets may 
be less than 12 hours, dependent upon incident location. Yet while it 
seems reasonable to expect that SNS assets are stored in relative close 
proximity to high-risk areas, such as Washington, DC, and New York 
City, additional logistical operations may extend the time required to 
dispense PEP beyond this 12-hour delivery benchmark. Factors to be 
considered when estimating time until dispensing include the time 
required to obtain approval to deploy, as well as the time required to 
receive, sort and deliver the assets from RSS sites.  
• Cost (A): Jurisdictions electing to rely solely on the SNS bear little direct 
cost for the provision of PEP. Costs associated with procurement, rotation, 
storage and replacement are the burden of the DSNS. Although these 
direct costs are deferred to federal agencies, communities should assess 
the possible economic impacts associated with the delay of PEP 
medication. A decreased workforce due to fear or illness, as well as 
increased hospital admissions resulting from the delay in availability of 
PEP, may have long-term financial impacts at the local and state level. 
• Logistics (A): RSS and POD site operations are the obligation of local 
jurisdictions once SNS assets are delivered, and are typically the 
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responsibility of state and local public health agencies. Law enforcement 
resources are also needed to provide security for RSS sites, during 
delivery, and at PODs. As required by the CRI, state and local 
jurisdictions regularly exercise RSS and POD operations. 
• Stakeholder Acceptance (A): Sole reliance on the SNS is likely to result in 
disparity in the level of acceptance among various stakeholder groups. 
Local government officials with tight budgets will likely favor this model, 
as there is minimal direct financial impact. First responders on the other 
hand, may be reluctant to report for duty if they and their families are not 
provided with timely and adequate PEP protection. Similarly, it is 
probable that business community members with the knowledge that 
community down-time means business down-time, will favor a more 
timely means of PEP for the entire population. Lastly, it is expected that 
healthcare professionals from private practice and hospital settings are 
likely to experience an increased number of patient encounters, many 
motivated by fear, associated with any delay in the availability of PEP. To 
alleviate any unnecessary burden on the health care system, it is likely that 
healthcare professionals will favor a model that allows for earlier access to 
PEP. 
• Comprehensiveness (A): The mass quantities of medications maintained 
by the SNS are sufficient to provide ample coverage for the entire 
population of any metropolitan region in the U.S. or its territories. Once 
states receive assets from the SNS, they must strive to ensure equitable 
distribution among all populations. From a societal perspective, this is 
perhaps the most equitable of the models, as no preference is given to first 
responders or other select portions of the population. To maintain this 
equality however, jurisdictions must consider a dispensing mechanism 
beyond PODs, as they may not be accessible to elderly, special needs, or 
indigent populations. It is important to consider nevertheless, that failure 
to provide early access to PEP for first responders and healthcare 
providers may actually slow the overall dispensing process due to a lack of 
personnel resources.  
 
Policy Option Timeliness Cost Logistics Stakeholder 
Acceptance 
Comprehensiveness 
Local Stockpiles B B A A B 
Third Party 
Inventory Mgmt 
B B C B B 
Pre-Dispensed to 
Homes  
A C A B B 
SNS Only C A A A  A 
Table 1.   Outcomes matrix 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The above discussion and matrix analysis provides a framework by which state 
and local stakeholders can evaluate a PEP model based on the priorities of an individual 
jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, especially those that are more rural, may find that limited 
financial and logistical resources might suggest that reliance on the SNS may be the most 
suitable model. In contrast, regions with less limited financial resources and sufficient 
administrative (logistical) capabilities may choose an alternative option, such as pre-
dispensing antibiotics to first responders for storage in their homes. 
Under ideal circumstances, the collective goal of all jurisdictions is to provide 
complete and immediate PEP coverage in the event of an aerosolized anthrax attack, 
although this practice typically is cost prohibitive. The evaluation of factors, such as 
transportation resource availability, may lead neighboring states or jurisdictions to the 
conclusion that a different PEP model is most suitable for each. Furthermore, the rapid 
availability of PEP for dispensing is likely to benefit only those jurisdictions with a 
demonstrated proficiency in POD activation and throughput procedures. A jurisdiction 
with little or no POD throughput capability is unlikely to benefit from an unlimited 
supply of PEP. In this case, allocating funding to stockpile more medications than can be 
distributed prior to SNS arrival is not practical.  
E. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
This study evaluates the characteristics of four models that are currently available 
for the provision of PEP. The data collected and analyzed was unclassified, open source 
data. PEP models that are employed outside of the United States were not analyzed as 
part of this study. Beyond the scope of this study, there are numerous opportunities for 
future research, some of which include the following. 
• The consideration of the availability of pediatric dosing for PEP, as each 
of the models discussed in this research provides only adult dosing.  
• An evaluation of the vulnerabilities presented in the event that an attack is 
executed utilizing a strain of anthrax that is resistant to pre-dispensed or 
stockpiled antibiotics.  
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• The exploration of clinical research specific to the status of the 
development of future alternative medical countermeasures for biological 
incidents. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Much like the public fear of bioterrorism, funding has waned in the years since 
the 2001 Amerithrax attacks. The threat of bioterrorism is not going away. State and local 
planners must remain vigilant in their preparedness efforts to provide effective post-
exposure prophylaxis distribution while optimizing resources. Doing so requires the 
comprehensive engagement of stakeholders from multiple disciplines. Evaluative tools, 
such as the decision matrix presented in this thesis, should be employed to continuously 
assess whether or not communities have employed the most effective mass prophylaxis 
strategy for use in the event of an aerosolized anthrax attack. Although it is impossible to 
predict if and when an anthrax attack will occur, history, as well as the words of French 
microbiologist Louis Pasteur remind us that “chance favors the prepared mind.”227 
227 Wikipedia, s.v. “Louis Pasteur,” last modified June 20, 2014, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/ 
Louis_Pasteur.  
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